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DISTINGUISHING TRESPASS AND NUISANCE:
A JOURNEY THROUGH A SHIFTING
BORDERLAND
OSBORNE M. REYNOLDS, JR.*
The line between the torts of trespass and nuisance has been described as
having become "wavering and uncertain." 1 What are the basic definitions
of these torts and their key distinguishing features? To what extent have
the torts now merged? For what purposes is it still necessary to distinguish
them? What is the likely future of these torts - merger, separate existence,
or a continued state of uncertainty? These are the questions that this article
will consider.
Definitions of "Trespass," "Private Nuisance," and "Public Nuisance"
Historically, the tort of trespass required an invasion that interfered with
the plaintiff's right of exclusive possession in his real property and that was
a direct result of some act of the defendant. 2 The direct-result requirement
had its roots in the distinction between the old writs of trespass and trespass
on the case and has now been rejected by most courts. 3 Thus, in modem
times, the tort of trespass has come to mean simply an intentional and
unprivileged use or other invasion of another person's real property. 4 Nui-
sance, which has been observed to have "meant all things to all people, ' 5
is complicated by its division into the torts of public and private nuisance. 6
* Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma. S.J.D., 1968, Southern Methodist Univer-
sity; LL.M., 1965, Stanford University; J.D., 1964, B.A., 1961, University of Arizona. The
author expresses deep appreciation to his research assistant, Paul Prather.
1. PROSSER & KEETON ON Tm LAW OF TORTS 622 (W. Keeton 5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter
PROSSER & KEETON]. See W. RoDnms, ENvmoNmENTAL LAw § 2.13, at 154-57 (1977). See
generally RE SATm:NT (SEcoND) OF TORTS introductory note to §§ 821A-840E on the trespass-
nuisance distinction (1977).
2. See PROSSER & K aoN, supra note 1, at 67.
3. See id. at 69-71 (citing Rushing v. Hooper-McDonald, Inc., 293 Ala. 56, 300 So. 2d
94 (1974), as to modern rejection of the direct-invasion requirement); RESTATm-NT (SEcoND)
OF TORTS § 158 comment h (1964). On the development of the action of trespass on the case,
and the distinction between it and the action of trespass according to whether the harm was
direct or indirect, see the somewhat differing accounts of Dix, The Origins of the Action of
Trespass on the Case, 46 YALE L.J. 1142 (1937); Plucknett, Case and the Statute of Westminster
II, 31 CoTJum. L. REv. 778 (1931).
4. See Keeton, Trespass, Nuisance, and Strict Liability, 59 CoLuTM. L. REv. 457, 465
(1959) [hereinafter Keeton, Trespass]; Note, Deposit of Gaseous and Invisible Solid Industrial
Wastes Held to Constitute Trespass, 60 CoLuM. L. REv. 877 (1960) [hereinafter Note, Deposit
of Wastes]; RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) oF TORTS § 821 (1977).
5. PROSSER & KTON, supra note 1, at 616. See generally E. GAmr & H. GAR=ETT,
LAw op NuisANcEs 4 (3d ed. 1908); Smith, Torts Without Particular Names, 69 U. PA. L.
REv. 91, 110-12 (1921).
6. See PROSSER & KraToN, supra note 1, at 618; J. SAImoND, LAw OF TORTS 233 (8th
ed. 1934); P. WWnH-a, TxT-EOOK OF Ta LAw OF TORT 466 (1937 ed.).
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Public nuisance, which traditionally entails criminal as well as possible civil
liability and involves an unreasonable interference with the plaintiff's en-
joyment of life, is a field unto itself that is more thoroughly covered
elsewhere.7 It must be recognized as still another possibly overlapping basis
of tort recovery. The tort that more often borders upon trespass, however,
is private nuisance, which is basically a substantial and unreasonable inter-
ference with the plaintiff's use and enjoyment of his real property.8 Thus,
trespass involves an actionable invasion of a possessor's interest in the
exclusive possession of his real property, while private nuisance is an ac-
tionable invasion of a possessor's interest in the use and enjoyment of that
property.9 Private nuisance differs from other fields of tort liability in that
it is "confined to injuries which primarily affect the use or enjoyment of
land."10
In one respect, the old element of trespass that prescribed a direct invasion
of the plaintiff's interests still has significance; for it remains true that in
trespass, the defendant's act is in itself regarded as wrongful and tortious,
while in nuisance, it is only the consequences of the act that create tort
liability." Thus, if I walk upon my neighbor's yard without authorization,
that is wrongful and gives rise without more to tort liability for trespass.
However, if I play loud music on my own property, that is not wrongful,
but may become such - and create tort liability for nuisance - if and
only if it unreasonably and substantially interferes with my neighbor's use
and enjoyment of his real property. The tort of nuisance requires both
conduct and consequences following therefrom, while trespass requires only
a specified form of conduct. 12
7. See Prosser, Private Action for Public Nuisance, 52 VA. L. Rnv. 997 (1966); Reynolds,
Public Nuisance: A Crime in Tort Law, 31 OymA. L. Rav. 318 (1978) [hereinafter Crime in
Tort Law]. As outlined in these articles, the requisites of tort liability for public nuisance have
usually included an obstruction of or interference with a public right (or, under much modern
authority, with a considerable number of people); violation of some criminal law; and a
showing by the plaintiff of particular harm to him, different in kind (not merely in degree)
from that suffered by th. general public. There is some recent trend to eliminate the requirement
of violation of a criminal law. Section 821B of the Restatement (Second) of Torts lists such
a violation as merely one of several factors to be assessed in determining the unreasonableness
of defendant's conduct, it is this unreasonableness, not defendant's criminal responsibility,
that the Restatement makes a requisite of tort liability. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS §
821B & comment d (1977). See Armory Park Neighborhood Ass'n v. Episcopal Community
Servs., 148 Ariz. 1, 712 P.2d 914 (1985) (regardless of presence of criminal statute, liability
for public nuisance depends on whether conduct is unreasonable; the plaintiff's complaint,
seeking injunction, should not be dismissed merely for failure to allege criminal violation). See
generally Comment, "Feed the Hungry, but Not on Our Block" - Armory Park Neighborhood
Association v. Episcopal Community Services in Arizona, 28 ARiz. L. Rav. 121 (1986).
8. See PROSSER & IKEETON, supra note 1, at 619; 1 T. STREET, FouNDAnoNs OF LEGAL
LIu~n~ Y 211-12 (1906); RESTATE ENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (1977).
9. Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 221 Or. 86, 342 P.2d 790 (1959), cert. denied, 362
U.S. 918 (1960).
10. Winfield, Nuisarce as a Tort, 4 CAmlasunoE L.J. 189, 195 (1931) [hereinafter Nuisance
as a Tort].
11. See Central of Ga. Ry. v. Americus Constr. Co., 133 Ga. 392, 398, 65 S.E. 855, 857
(1909).
12. See Keeton, Trespass, supra note 4, at 464-69.
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Clearly an unauthorized use or other invasion of my neighbor's real
property may disturb not only his interest in possession, creating trespass
liability, but may also simultaneously disturb his use and enjoyment of that
property, causing nuisance liability. Therefore, the torts of trespass and
nuisance are not mutually exclusive and may coexist in the same set of
facts. 3 The plaintiff will then have the option of suing on either theory, or
both, so long as he receives no more than one full recovery for all harm
suffered.' 4 The dual liability may be based on precisely the same conduct
of the defendant, with the nuisance cause of action merely having the
additional requirement of wrongful consequences from that conduct.' 5 Tres-
pass and nuisance may both be present not only when the defendant's
conduct consists of a single, "one-shot" act, but also when it is continuing
in nature, such as repeatedly sending a bothersome substance onto the
plaintiff's land.16 Indeed, it has been said that in most cases of trespass or
nuisance, the other tort is probably present as well.'
7
If the tort of trespass required that the defendant personally enter or
otherwise invade the plaintiff's property, the situations of possible dual
liability would no doubt be reduced. Yet it has long been recognized that
a trespasser need not invade another's property in person but need only
have been a substantial factor in causing or permitting such an invasion to
occur, as in the situation of directing a bothersome substance onto the
neighbor's land.'8 Thus, one who sets in motion a force that is substantially
certain to enter, without authorization, another's premises may be liable in
trespass. 19 Once the bothersome substance has entered the plaintiff's prem-
ises, it may certainly interfere with the plaintiff's use and enjoyment of that
property, leading to nuisance liability as well. 20 Physically, the invasion
underlying the trespass liability may be by inanimate objects, such as rocks
13. Fairview Farms, Inc. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 176 F. Supp. 178, 185-86 (D. Or. 1959)
(torts not mutually exclusive, and finding of a nuisance does not preclude the existence of a
trespass).
14. See Ryan v. City of Emmetsburg, 232 Iowa 600, 4 N.W.2d 435 (1942).
15. See Renken v. Harvey Aluminum (Inc.), 226 F. Supp. 169 (D. Or. 1963) (continuing
trespass may well be a nuisance).
16. See Borland v. Sanders Lead Co., 369 So. 2d 523 (Ala. 1979) (discharge of pollutants
onto property).
17. Note, Torts: Trespass, Nuisance, and E=mc2, 19 OKLA. L. REv. 117, 118 (1966)
[hereinafter Note, Torts] (observing that while in most cases, the intrusion affects both
possession and use or enjoyment, an "arbitrary determination" is nonetheless often made that
the intrusion is either trespass or nuisance, and this in turn determines the defenses available).
18. See Gregg v. Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp., 162 Tex. 26, 34, 344 S.W.2d 411, 416 (1961)
(entry may be made by causing or permitting a thing to cross the boundary of the premises);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158a (1964); cf. Fairview Farms, Inc. v. Reynolds Metals
Co., 176 F. Supp. 178, 188 (D. Or. 1959) (trespasser liable for all natural and proximate
results of his invasion).
19. Sheppard Envelope Co. v. Arcade Malleable Iron Co., 335 Mass. 180, 138 N.E.2d 777
(1956) (foundry emitted cinders and other gritty materials onto the plaintiff's premises).
20. See B & R Luncheonette, Inc. v. Fairmont Theatre Corp., 278 App. Div. 133, 103
N.Y.S.2d 747 (1951) (spray from the cooling tower on the roof of defendant's theater fell
onto the rear yard of the plaintiff's adjoining luncheonette, depriving the plaintiff of the use
of the yard as a summer garden).
1991] 229
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that are thrown21 or the foundation of a building that encroaches,2 so long
as the defendant is a substantial driving force behind the invasion. In many
such cases, there is, again, interference both with possessory interests and
with rights of use and enjoyment; thus, both the tort of trespass and the
tort of nuisance may arise.23
It has been noted that the theories behind these torts are "not inconsis-
tent" and that it is therefore proper to allow the plaintiff to proceed under
both.2 However, neither are the theories coterminous nor the terms syn-
onymous; for if the invasion is not an intentional interference with posses-
sion, then trespass will not lie. Yet there may be acts bothersome to the
use and enjoyment of land that do not disturb the possession thereof. Even
if intentional, these acts will create liability only if they unreasonably
interfere with use and enjoyment, thus causing a nuisance.
If an interference with any rights of either possession or use of property
is unintentional, negligence is the appropriate theory of recovery, again
requiring application of a reasonableness standard.Y Intentional invasions
of possession are thus treated with a severity which reflects the seriousness
with which the law historically regarded them and which is not accorded
invasions that are either accidental or that do not disturb possession. These
less serious intrusions must be found unreasonable before liability will apply.
Indeed, the esserce of private nuisance may be considered a disturbance
that would bother the reasonable person or, as often said in the American
cases, that would "affect the ordinary comfort of human existence as
understood by the American people in their present state of enlighten-
ment." 2 The cases of such disturbances overlap not only the boundaries of
trespass liability, but also those of public nuisance liability, which involves
criminal interference with the use of a public place or the activities of a
large portion of a community. This may occur, for example, when a person
is insulted or interfered with while using a public street.28 An individual
harmed by a public nuisance can recover in tort only by showing that his
harm was different from that suffered by the community as a whole, but
21. North Jellico Coal Co. v. Helton, 187 Ky. 394, 219 S.W. 185 (1920) (coal company
threw rocks and slat.- upon the plaintiff's land).
22. See Milton v. Puffer, 207 Mass. 416, 93 N.E. 634 (1911) (continuing trespass found).
23. Note, Deposit of Wastes, supra note 4, at 878.
24. Bradley v. American Smelting & Ref. Co., 104 Wash. 2d 677, 689, 709 P.2d 782, 789
(1985).
25. See Keeton & Jones, Tort Liability and the Oil and Gas Industry II, 39 Tnx. L. REv.
253, 256 (1961).
26. Everett v. Paschall, 61 Wash. 47, 52, 111 P. 879, 881 (1910). To similar effect, see
Stevens v. Rockport Granite Co., 216 Mass. 486, 104 N.E. 371 (1914); Kroecker v. Camden
Coke Co., 82 N.J. Eq. 373, 88 A. 955 (1913). See generally PROSSER & KEETON, supra note
1, at 88.
27. See Seavey, Nuisance: Contributory Negligence and Other Mysteries, 65 HAxv. L. Ray.
984, 984-85 (1952). See generally J. SALMOND, supra note 6, at 233; Newark, The Boundaries
of Nuisance, 65 LAW Q. Rav. 480, 482 (1949).
28. See Wilson v. Parent, 228 Or. 354, 365 P.2d 72 (1961) (obscene words and gestures




is not required to show that the harm was connected with his use and
enjoyment of his real property. In effect, the plaintiff must merely show
that there was interference with his enjoyment of life.29
Again, there is overlap, because the same activity, such as operation of
an airport, may affect the rights to peace and quiet enjoyed generally by a
community and may also affect an individual's use and enjoyment of his
particular real property. Thus there may in such a situation be both public
and private nuisance liability.30 There is, indeed, so much overlap between
the activities that constitute private nuisances and those that amount to
public nuisances that the term "nuisance" is often defined without indication
of which type of nuisance is meant. For example, nuisance has been defined
as anything that unlawfully causes harm, inconvenience, or damage, 31 and
it has been concluded that a "nuisance dispute" may arise whenever a
person injures his neighbor in a continuing way. 32 It has thus been observed
that "[a] nuisance, public or private, arises when a person uses his own
property in such a manner as to cause injury to the property of another.
'33
Yet because public nuisance is generally a crime that only incidentally may
also lead to tort liability, the main concern of tort law and the main area
of possible overlap with trespass liability is with private nuisance. Trespass
and private nuisance are the two principal torts fundamentally concerned
with protecting rights of private ownership in real property.
Distinctions Between Trespass and Private Nuisance
What, then, are the traditional distinguishing characteristics of these two
torts, and what changes in the distinctions have occurred in recent years?
One of the most frequently mentioned distinctions is that trespass requires
an invasion of the plaintiff's property by some tangible matter, while
nuisance does not. 34 One authority notes that it is "reasonably clear that
the mere intentional introduction onto the land of another of smoke, gas,
noise, and the like" is not actionable as a trespass, but only as a possible
29. See Comment, Nuisance or Negligence: A Study in the Tyranny of Labels, 24 IND.
L.J. 402, 404 (1949) [hereinafter Comment, Nuisance or Negligence] (noting that an action
for public nuisance will lie "for injury to person or chattel completely unconnected with the
use or enjoyment of the plaintiff's land." Thus, the plaintiff can sue on a public nuisance
that is not a private nuisance as to him.
30. See Annotation, Airport Operations or Flight of Aircraft as Nuisance, 79 A.L.R. 3D
253, 259 (1977) [hereinafter Annotation, Airport Operations].
31. See Comment, Nuisance: Contributory Negligence or Assumption of Risk as Defense,
28 TENN. L. Rnv. 561 (1961) [hereinafter Comment, Contributory Negligence] (citing BLACK'S
LAw DicONARY 1215 (4th ed. 1951)).
32. Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive and Dam-
age Remedies, 32 STA. L. Rav. 1075, 1075 & n.1 (1980).
33. Fairlawn Cemetery Ass'n v. First Presbyterian Church, 496 P.2d 1185, 1187 (Okla.
1972).
34. See Davis v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 251 Or. 239, 445 P.2d 481 (1968); Waschak v.
Moffatt, 379 Pa. 441, 109 A.2d 310 (1954); Thackery v. Union Portland Cement Co., 64 Utah
437, 231 P. 813 (1924); Riblet v. Spokane-Portland Cement Co., 41 Wash. 2d 249, 248 P.2d
380 (1952); Bartlett v. Grasselli Chem. Co., 92 W. Va. 445, 115 S.E. 451 (1922).
1991]
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nuisance s Certainly the shouting of obscene or insulting words at the
plaintiff, though directed at him while he stands on his own land, cannot
be a trespass to the real property. What is lacking for trespass liability in
these situations is the essential physical invasion by a tangible substance,
such as is present ia the piling of dirt on the plaintiff's land 7 or knowingly
allowing gasoline to seep onto the plaintiff's property.
38
So long as there is a physical invasion, trespass has been found in a great
variety of occurrences: projecting shotgun pellets across the land of an-
other;39 dropping particles of molten lead on the plaintiff's land;40 and
permitting baseballs to be knocked over the fence of a ballpark onto the
plaintiff's adjacent premises. 41 However, all of these situations involve entry
or other invasion by a tangible substance. When there is, for instance,
merely the emission of sound waves onto the plaintiff's property, traditional
principles do not allow trespass recovery but only recognize the possibility
of a nuisance. 42 The same is true even if the invasion is continuing or
recurrent, as when dust and smoke are repeatedly released over the plaintiff's
land 43 Environmental legislation has not changed such results, because
statutes and regulations on smoke and other pollutants merely declare certain
occurrences to constitute nuisances, whether or not they would have been
such at common law, but make no attempt to impose trespass liability."
Similarly, the casting of light onto another's premises might create a nuisance
but not a trespa.s. 45
35. PRossER & Ke'moN, supra note 1, at 71.
36. Wilson v. Parent, 228 Or. 354, 365 P.2d 71 (1961) (law of nuisance, not trespass, must
apply).
37. Fairlawn Cemetery Ass'n v. First Presbyterian Church, 496 P.2d 1185 (Okla. 1972)
(church piled dirt on adjoining cemetery's land).
38. See Hudson it. Peavey Oil Co., 279 Or. 3, 566 P.2d 175 (1977).
39. Herrin v. Sutherland, 74 Mont. 587, 241 P. 328 (1925); Digirolamo v. Philadelphia
Gun Club, 371 Pa. 40, 89 A.2d 357 (1952). On above-surface invasions of real property, see
generally infra notes 65-75 and accompanying text.
40. Van Alstyne v. Rochester Tel. Corp., 163 Misc. 258, 296 N.Y.S. 726 (City Ct. 1937)
(liability for death of dag resulting from trespass by particles of molten lead).
41. Hennessy v. City of Boston, 265 Mass. 559, 164 N.E. 470 (1929). Hennessy was
criticized in Keeton & Jones, supra note 25, at 258-59, on the ground it is doubtful there was
trespass by the proprietor of the ballpark since he would not know that any particular ball
player who stepped up to bat would hit the ball onto the plaintiff's land.
42. Wilson v. Interlcke Steel Co., 32 Cal. 3d 229, 649 P.2d 922, 185 Cal. Rptr. 280 (1982)
(noise waves not a trespass, at least in absence of damage, but must be dealt with as possible
nuisance).
43. See Thackery v. Union Portland Cement Co., 64 Utah 437, 231 P. 813 (1924) (cement
plant released dust and smoke over farm).
44. See Annotation, Validity of Regulation of Smoke and Other Air Pollution, 78 A.L.R.
2D 1305, 1327 (1961) (noting that "[m]ost smoke regulations specifically declare that the
emission of smoke under the circumstances described in the regulation is a nuisance; other
enactments prohibit the emission of such smoke without specifically declaring it to be a
nuisance.").
45. See Shepler v. Kansas Milling Co., 128 Kan. 554, 278 P. 757 (1929); The Shelburne,
Inc. v. Crossan Corp., 95 N.J. Eq. 188, 122 A. 749 (1923); Amphitheaters, Inc. v. Portland
Meadows, 184 Or. 336, 198 P.2d 847 (1948) (also discussing trespass but concluding that the
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol44/iss2/3
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Gradually, however, the cases have come to emphasize that the require-
ment of a tangible invasion is really just a corollary of the basic limitation
on trespass, which is that trespass must involve an intrusion interfering with
the plaintiff's right of exclusive possession. 46 Such a shift in emphasis opens
the door for possible recognition of trespasses by some substances usually
regarded as intangible, such as gases containing fluorides and particulates, 4
because entry by such substances may arguably be an invasion of possessory
rights.
Closely related to the traditional requirement that a trespass be by a
tangible substance is the rule that in trespass the intruding agency must be
visible to the naked human eye. 4 However, this has been recognized as an
outgrowth of the now-discarded restriction that a trespass must involve a
"direct" and substantial intrusion by the defendant: "If the agent could
not be seen, it was considered indirect and less substantial, hence, a nui-
sance." 49 Again, it has increasingly been recognized as only a corollary to,
or usual result of, the basic rule that trespass must invade a possessor's
interest in exclusive possession of real property, which may sometimes be
satisfied even though the invasion is invisible to the naked eye and even
though the intrusion might also qualify as a nuisance.50
The fundamental distinction between trespass and nuisance, underlying
such other distinctions as the requirements that a trespass be tangible and
visible, is the definitional idea of trespass as an invasion of possessory
interests in real property and of nuisance as an invasion of the use and
law of nuisance should govern - then finding no nuisance in the particular case). See generally
Annotation, Casting of Light on Another's Premises as Constituting Actionable Wrong, 5
A.L.R. 2D 705 (1949) [hereinafter Annotation, Casting of Light].
46. See Annotation, Recovery in Trespass for Injury to Land Caused by Airborne Pollu-
tants, 2 A.L.R. 4TH 1054, 1055 (1980) [hereinafter Annotation, Recovery in Trespass] (com-
menting in regard to the cases in this area that "some courts now hold that the test for
whether an invasion of a property interest is a trespass or a nuisance does not depend upon
whether the intruding agent is an intangible or tangible substance, but whether the invasion
interferes with the right to the exclusive possession of property, and that an injury caused by
an airborne pollutant may be a trespass.").
47. See Fairview Farms, Inc. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 176 F. Supp. 178 (D. Or. 1959)
(operator of dairy farm had trespass action against aluminum plant for damages caused by
airborne gases, liquids, and solids settling on the dairy farm). The court notes that odors and
gases were historically not trespasses, only possible nuisances, but points out that a trespass
may be committed by casting even a grain of sand on another's land. Id. at 185 (citing Sleep
v. Morrill, 199 Or. 128, 260 P.2d 487 (1953) (small quantity of limbs and brush deposited on
the plaintiff's land; damages recovered for trespass)). See generally infra notes 91-108 and
accompanying text.
48. See Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 221 Or. 86, 93-94, 342 P.2d 790, 793-94 (1959)
(discussing but rejecting the traditional view requiring that a trespass involve some 'thing'
which can be seen with the naked eye"), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 918 (1960).
49. Borland v. Sanders Lead Co., 369 So. 2d 523, 527 (Ala. 1979) (citing 1 F. HItAp &
F. JAws, THE LAW OF TORTS § 1.23 (1956)).
50. See Borland, 369 So. 2d at 530 (concluding that even an indirect invasion of the
plaintiffs premises can amount to an actionable trespass if it interferes with the plaintiffs
interest in exclusive possession, as when a substance is deposited on the plaintiffs land).
1991]
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enjoyment of land, with possibly some incidental harm to possessory inter-
ests. 51 Setting in motion a force that is substantially certain to damage real
property leads to txrespass liability, while unreasonable interference with a
possessor's use and enjoyment of that property creates nuisance liability. 2
The one tort damages the property itself; the other damages the possessor's
use thereof. Of course, the same conduct may damage both the property
and its use. If the defendant creates a breeding ground for flies on his
premises and the flies intrude on the plaintiff's property, the resulting
situation shows the possible presence of both torts. There may certainly be
unreasonable interference with use and enjoyment. Additionally, at least a
prima facie case of setting in motion a force that damages possessory rights,
and thus causes a trespass, is also established.53
The modern trend is to de-emphasize absolute rules requiring that trespass
involve a tangible, visible agent and to emphasize instead an analysis of the
interest that is disturbed or harmedY4 Trespass is described as a wrong
against actual possession, 5 while nuisance is often described in terms of the
disturbing consequences to the plaintiff's senses (sight, hearing, smell, etc.)
in connection with his use of real property.56 Thus, it has been suggested
that decisions oil whether water, oil, or gasoline invading a plaintiff's land
can be regarded a; trespasses should turn on whether or not the invasion
interferes with the plaintiff's possession.57 Often such interference can be
found in these cases, as when the defendant pumped contaminated water
upon the plaintiff's yard, causing the plaintiff to develop polio;5s or when
the defendant constructed a dam in such a way as to cause water to flood
the plaintiff's land.5 9 Yet these illustrations again show the frequent overlap
of trespass and nuisance, for it would surely be arguable in these cases that
there was, in addition to the interference with possession, also interference
with use and enjoyment of the plaintiff's property.
51. See Ryan v. City of Emmetsburg, 232 Iowa 600, 4 N.W.2d 435 (1942).
52. Miller v. Carnation Co., 33 Colo. App. 62, 516 P.2d 661 (1973).
53. See id. (failure of defendants to remove chicken manure from underneath their chicken
house resulted in obnoxious odors, caused breeding of flies, and produced a home for mice
and rats; all of this %as relevant as to possible nuisance liability, and the invasion of the
plaintiff's premises by the flies could be basis of trespass liability).
54. See Borland, 369 So. 2d at 529.
55. See Kanniappen v. Govender, 1962 (1) S.A. 101 (N) (the plaintiff not yet in possession
of land could not maintain trespass).
56. See Seagraves v. Portland City Temple, 269 Or. 28, 522 P,2d 893 (1974) (discussing
the evidence that may be used to prove a nuisance in a nuisance action against an airstrip).
57. Keeton & Jones, supra note 25, at 260.
58. Wardrop v. City of Manhattan Beach, 160 Cal. App. 2d 779, 326 P.2d 15 (1958). But
cf. Phillips v. Sun Oil Co., 307 N.Y. 328, 121 N.E.2d 249 (1954) (no trespass liability when
the plaintiff's water well was contaminated by gasoline from defendant's pump since defendant
did not know or have substantiai certainty as to the seepage of the gasoline).
59. Bobo v. Young, 258 Ala. 222, 61 So. 2d 814 (1952); Winchester Waterworks Co. v.
Holliday, 241 Ky. 762, 45 S.W.2d 9 (1931); cf. Humphreys-Mexia Co. v. Arseneaux, 116 Tex.
603, 297 S.W. 225 (1927) (riparian landowner may construct a dam to create a reservoir but




It has been observed, "While the distinction between invasions that
constitute an interference with possession and those that do not is funda-
mental and important, the line of demarcation cannot be drawn, as is so
often true with other legal dichotomies, with mathematical exactness." 60 It
is not surprising then that cases and other authorities fall back on rules of
thumb, such as the rule stating that trespass ordinarily involves physical
damage to property,61 while nuisance involves activities that are offensive,
annoying, unpleasant, or obnoxious to neighboring property owners.
62 It
has also been observed that a nuisance, unlike a trespass, will generally
involve a continuing or repeated disturbance. A trespass, on the other hand,
may be a "one-shot" occurrence, but if continued, it too will usually become
a nuisance. 63 Dust, for example, sent onto the plaintiff's premises may
constitute a nuisance, but such liability will normally be found only if the
occurrence is frequent, not merely occasional. 64 These rules of thumb serve
only to reach the fundamental determination of whether, as with the physical
entry, there has been an interference with possession, or whether, as with
the repeated disturbances, there has been interference with use and enjoy-
ment, or whether there have been both interferences.
The definition of trespass as an invasion of possessory rights in real
property leaves open the question concerning the extent of those rights.
Assuming that a person has rights in the surface of land, do these extend
to the subsurface beneath and the airspace above that land? The old
common-law maxim was "cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum, "
meaning that ownership of the surface included with it everything under it
and over it, up to the heavens and down to the center of the earth. 6 This
meant that a physical invasion of airspace gave rise to a trespass action in
the surface owner.
However, the development of aviation forced the courts to modify their
view, initially by often recognizing a privilege to trespass for otherwise
60. Keeton, Trespass, supra note 4, at 466.
61. See Wilson v. Interlake Steel Co., 32 Cal. 3d 229, 232, 649 P.2d 922, 924, 185 Cal.
Rptr. 280, 282 (1982) (noise waves insufficient for trespass unless they damage property).
62. See Renken v. Harvey Aluminum (Inc.), 226 F. Supp. 169, 175-76 (D. Or. 1963).
63. Id. at 175 (citing York v. Stallings, 217 Or. 13, 341 P.2d 529 (1959)).
64. Several courts have refused to enjoin a dust-producing activity when the dust was only
occasional. See Heppenstall Co. v. Berkshire Chem. Co., 130 Conn. 485, 35 A.2d 845 (1944)
(fertilizer plant); Hofstetter v. George M. Myers, Inc., 170 Kan. 564, 228 P.2d 522 (1951)
(asphalt plant); Hart v. Wagner, 184 Md. 40, 40 A.2d 47 (1944) (burning trash); Bentley v.
Empire Portland Cement Co., 48 Misc. 457, 96 N.Y.S. 831 (Sup. Ct. 1905) (cement plant).
See generally Annotation, Dust as Nuisance, 24 A.L.R. 2D 194 (1952) [hereinafter Annotation,
Dust].
65. See Amphitheaters, Inc. v. Portland Meadows, 184 Or. 336, 198 P.2d 847 (1948). See
generally Anderson, Airspace Trespass, 27 J. Am LAw 341 (1960); Hackley, Trespassers in
the Sky, 21 MIwN. L. Rnv. 773 (1937); Mace, Ownership of Airspace, 17 U. CQN. L. Ray.
343 (1948). The maxim quoted is credited to Lord Coke. 1 E. COKE, A Cos mTARY ON
LrrLEToN bk. 1, ch. 1, §§ 1, 4a (1853 ed.). See Klein, Cujus Est Solum Ejus Est - Quousque
Tandem?, 26 J. Am LAw & Comm. 237 (1959). The origin and development of the doctrine
are well discussed in Bouv6, Private Ownership of Airspace, I Am L. Ra,. 232, 376 (1930).
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lawful flights, at least if there were no unreasonable interference with surface
use." Gradually, it came to be recognized that thq trespass rule that assumed
liability for every unauthorized entry was simply inappropriate to modern-
day invasions by aircraft, and most courts came to the view that any liability
should be in nuisance and should thus depend on whether there was unrea-
sonable and substantial interference with the surface. 67 This was, in effect,
the standard applied even by courts that continued to speak in "trespass"
terms. In above-surface invasion cases, these courts merely redefined trespass
to bring it into line with the standard meaning of "nuisance. ' 68 Thus, some
authorities have continued to speak of the surface owner owning the air
column above his land as far as is necessary for the full enjoyment of the
land itself - a theory often called the doctrine of "effective possession."
69
This doctrine received the support of the United States Supreme Court in
a case in which a governmental "taking" of property rights was found to
have resulted from repeated, low-level overflights of land by government
aircraft. The Court stated, "The landowner owns at least as much of the
space above the ground as he can occupy or use in connection with the
land. The fact that he does not occupy it in a physical sense - by the
erection of buildings and the like - is not material.'" 0
However, most courts in the past few decades have altogether forsaken
trespass terminology for the reasoning and language of nuisance law and
have concluded that liability in the overflight cases should depend on the
unreasonableness and substantiality of disturbance to surface use. 71 Because
flight thousands of feet above a person's land generally poses no threat of
interference with any ongoing or contemplated activities, it is thought
inappropriate, and burdensome to commercial progress, to recognize a cause
of action in such situations unless an unreasonable disturbance to the surface
owner is found. And "[alt the point where 'reasonableness' enters the
judicial process we take leave of trespass and steer into the discretionary
byways of nuisance." 72 Trespass analysis is still used in an occasional case
66. See Hinman v. Pacific Air Transp., 84 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 300 U.S.
654 (1937); Brandes v. Mitterling, 67 Ariz. 349, 196 P.2d 464 (1948); Anderson v. Souza, 38
Cal. 2d 825, 243 P.2d 497 (1952); Vanderslice v. Shawn, 26 Del. Ch. 225, 27 A.2d 87 (1942).
67. See Delta Air Corp. v. Kersey, 193 Ga. 862, 869, 20 S.E.2d 245, 249 (1942); Hyde v.
Somerset Air Serv., Inc., I N.J. Super. 346, 351-52, 61 A.2d 645, 647-48 (Ch. 1948). See
generally Note, Airplane Noise: Problem in Tort Law and Federalism, 74 HAv. L. REv. 1581,
1583-84 (1961) [hereinafter Note, Airplane Noise].
68. See Antonik v. Chamberlain, 81 Ohio App. 465, 78 N.E.2d 752 (1947); Cheskov v.
Port of Seattle, 55 'Wash. 2d 416, 421-24, 348 P.2d 673, 676-78 (1960). See generally Mace,
supra note 65, at 361-67; Note, Property - Property Rights in Airspace - Pre-Emption by
Federal Government of Regulatory Powers, 35 OR. L. Ray. 296, 299 (1956).
69. See Note, Air Law: Prescriptive Rights to Airspace, 3 Ora. L. Rv. 423, 423-24 &
n.5 (1950).
70. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 264 (1946) (citation omitted); see Freeman v.
United States, 167 F. Supp. 541 (W.D. Okla. 1958); Highland Park, Inc. v. United States,
161 F. Supp. 597 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
71. See Seagraves v. Portland City Temple, 269 Or. 28, 522 P.2d 893 (1974). See generally
Annotation, Airport Operations, supra note 30, at 253.
72. Atkinson v. Bernard, Inc., 223 Or. 624, 631, 355 P.2d 229, 232 (1960). See generally
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of injury caused by crop-dusting or crop-spraying, when generally there is
an entry onto the plaintiff's premises of the substance sprayed as well as
the aircraft. 73 Yet even here some authorities regard nuisance as more
appropriate, allowing a balancing of the rights of the parties. 74 Courts also
seem inclined toward using the nuisance analysis, balancing public need
against private harm, when sonic booms have allegedly caused or threatened
damage to surface owners. 75
When an invasion has occurred below rather than above the surface,
the old common law also regarded the surface owner as having a trespass
action for interference with his possessory rights.7 6 Here, there has been
no impetus for change quite so compelling as that provided by aviation
in the above-surface cases, but there has nonetheless been gradual recog-
nition that there is no reason or need for allowing recovery unless there
is harm to surface uses.7 7 Thus, it is increasingly suggested that a nuisance
approach, allowing a balancing of the interests involved, is the desirable
one.78 The orthodox rules applied to surface invasions are again not
appropriate to subsurface invasions, just as they are not in above-surface
invasions, because harm or threat of harm to the reasonably practical uses
of the surface will be rare. 79 The surface owner's rights are said to extend
only to the depth to which he may reasonably use the land.80 Of course,
Harvey, Landowners' Rights in the Air Age: The Airport Dilemma, 56 MICH. L. REv. 1313
(1958).
73. See Cross v. Harris, 230 Or. 398, 370 P.2d 703 (1962) (action said to be for non-
willful trespass); Schronk v. Gilliam, 380 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964) (actionable trespass
found; no allegation of negligence required); cf. Aim v. Johnson Aviation Co., 75 Idaho 521,
275 P.2d 959 (1954) (court says a wrongful trespass was alleged, but lack of evidence resulted
in nonsuit).
74. See Wall v. Trogdon, 249 N.C. 747, 107 S.E.2d 757 (1959). See generally Annotation,
Liability for Injury Caused by Spraying or Dusting of Crops, 37 A.L.R. 3D 833 (1971) (noting
a trend toward strict liability because of the dangers posed by the chemicals used in these
activities); Note, Liability in Crop Dusting: A Survey, 42 Miss. L.J. 104 (1971); Note, Crop
Dusting: Legal Problems in a New Industry, 6 STAN. L. R1v. 69 (1953).
75. See Coxsey v. Hallaby, 231 F. Supp. 978 (W.D. Okla. 1964) (sonic boom test program
reasonable and did not deprive complainants of due process). See generally Arkin, Burdick &
Joyner, Sonic Boom - A Legal Nightmare, 19 OKLA. L. Ray. 292 (1966); Roth, Sonic Boom:
A New Legal Problem, 44 A.B.A. J. 216 (1958).
76. See Chartiers Block Coal Co. v. Mellon, 152 Pa. 286, 25 A. 597 (1893). Thus, it has
been held a trespass to mine under another's land. Maye v. Yappen, 23 Cal. 306 (1863). Or
to construct a tunnel under it. City of Chicago v. Troy Laundry Mach. Co., 162 F. 678 (7th
Cir. 1908). See generally PROSSER & KE=TON, supra note 1, at 82-83; Ball, The Vertical Extent
of Ownership in Land, 76 U. PA. L. Ray. 631, 684-89 (1928).
77. See Boehringer v. Montalto, 142 Misc. 560, 254 N.Y.S. 276 (Sup. Ct. 1931) (sewer 150
feet below surface not an invasion of landowner's rights); West Edmond Salt Water Disposal
Ass'n v. Rosecrans, 204 Okla. 9, 226 P.2d 965 (1950) (plaintiff had no right to prevent
adjoining landowner from causing migration of water beneath the plaintiff's land or to recover
quantum meruit therefor).
78. See Keeton & Jones, supra note 25, at 269. See generally PROSSER & KTON, supra
note 1, at 83.
79. See Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Manzierl, 361 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. 1962) (when railroad
commission permits injection of water into well, no trespass occurs).
80. See Boehringer v. Montalto, 142 Misc. 560, 254 N.Y.S. 276 (Sup. Ct. 1931); cf.
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mineral interests, such as coal"' or oil and gas,82 may, if owned by the
surface owner, be possessed as part of that owner's bundle of rights, and
an invasion of such sub-surface minerals may therefore be treated as a
trespass. Yet as with surface invasions, such sub-surface interference may
often constitute a nuisance also; and thus a court may speak of balancing
the interests and determining whether there has been "unreasonable inter-
ference."3
Changes in the Traditional Distinctions
In recent decades, there have been changes in the traditional distinctions
between trespas; and nuisance, particularly regarding the rule that trespass
must involve a tangible, visible invasion while nuisance need not. In the
1920s, it was considered definitely established that smoke and dust entering
the plaintiff's premises might give rise to nuisance liability but could not
constitute a trespass.84 This meant that any relief accorded the plaintiff,
whether by way of injunction, damages, or some combination thereof, was
subject to the court's balancing of the equities - i.e., weighing the interests
of each party, including such factors as each one's amount of investment,
the social importance of each property owner's use of his land, and the
diligence with which the plaintiff brought his action.8" When the defendant's
investment was large and the economic importance of the defendant's
operation to the community was great, the plaintiff could be denied an
injunction despite suffering serious harm and could, if given any relief, be
required to accept permanent damages, precluding any future recovery. 6
Tidewater Oil Co. v. Jackson, 320 F.2d 157 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 942 (1963)
(injecting water found to interfere unreasonably with the plaintiff's use of property, justifying
recovery; unnecessary to decide whether this should be based on trespass or nuisance).
81. North Jellico Coal Co. v. Helton, 187 Ky. 394, 219 S.W. 185 (1920) (willful taking of
coal from another's land).
82. See Gregg v. Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp., 162 Tex. 26, 344 S.W.2d 411 (1961).
83. See Tidewater Oil Co., 320 F.2d at 163 (action for damages to the plaintiffs' oil wells
due to flooding operations by defendant on adjoining property; liability found for intentional
and unreasonable interference with the plaintiffs' property rights).
84. See Thackery v. Union Portland Cement Co., 64 Utah 437, 231 P. 813 (1924).
85. McCleery v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 140 F. 951 (10th Cir. 1904) (dust and
vapor from defendant'; smelter damaged the plaintiffs' farms; the plaintiffs entitled to relief
despite their investment being slight in comparison with defendant's investment, but because
of the plaintiffs' dMay they would be granted an injunction only on condition of defendant's
refusal to pay damages).
86. Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312
(1970) (judgment allowing permanent damages to landowners due to dirt, smoke, and vibration
from defendant's cem'nt plant would preclude future recovery), noted in Case Note, 39
FoRDHAam L. REv. 338 (1970); Recent Decision, 54 MARQuETSE L. Rnv. 392 (1971); Comment,
Environmental Law - Nuisance - Injunctive Relief Denied in Private Action from Nuisance
Caused by Industrial Polluter: Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 45 N.Y.U. L. REv. 919 (1970);
Note, No Injunctive Relief in New York Against a Private Nuisance When Defendant's
Comparative Financial Hardship Outweighs the Injury to Complainant, 21 SYFAcusa L. Rv.
1243 (1970); Comment, Judicially Licensed Pollution: Condemnation of Private Property for
Private Use: Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 1970 WASH. U.L.Q. 367.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol44/iss2/3
1991] TRESPASS AND NUISANCE 239
Some balancing, of course, occurs in any case of possible equitable relief
(such as an injunction), regardless of the nature of the underlying tort.
However, when the alleged tort is private nuisance, the balancing extends
to the determination of whether that tort even exists - a balancing that
has not normally occurred in the finding of a trespass. Gradually, however,
a tendency has developed to recognize that the discharge onto a plaintiff's
premises of such substances as cinders may amount to a trespass, despite
the lack of sizable bulk or ready visibilityY Some authorities have persisted
in relying largely on nuisance precedents even while speaking partially in
trespass terms.8 Some have allowed a trespass action with little discussion,
despite the entry having apparently been by something intangible and invis-
ible such as gases, 9 while others have declared a trespass to exist in the
face of the court's own clear statement that the invasion was intangible
and/or invisible.90
Fluorides discharged by aluminum plants have particularly raised the
question of whether the resulting entry onto neighboring land may be a
trespass. Cases decided as recently as the early 1950s usually refused to find
trespass liability, sometimes relying partly on the old idea that trespass
required direct injury.9' However, a leading case from Oregon in 1959
clearly rejected this requirement and held that invasion by fluoride com-
pounds in the form of gases and particulates could, though the invading
matter was invisible to the naked eye, constitute a trespass. 9 Relying on
87. See Sheppard Envelope Co. v. Arcade Malleable Iron Co., 335 Mass. 180, 138 N.E.2d
777 (1956) (cinders and other gritty substances discharged from foundry onto adjoining premises
constituted continuing trespass).
88. See Hall v. De Weld Mica Corp., 244 N.C. 182, 93 S.E.2d 56 (1956) (suit for damages
from dust; trespass alleged and found, but nuisance cases examined by court in its discussion).
89. See Koch v. Eastern Gas & Fuel Assocs., 142 W. Va. 386, 95 S.E.2d 822 (1956)
(trespass action for harm from noxious gases).
90. See Hall v. De Weld Mica Corp., 244 N.C. 182, 93 S.E.2d 56 (1956) (court finds
trespass from clouds of dust partly made up of minute and invisible particles of silicon dioxide).
Compare the authorities considering whether or not the blowing of cigarette smoke onto a
person would involve sufficient physical contact to constitute a battery. See Comment, Where
There's Smoke There's Ire: The Search for Legal Paths to Tobacco-Free Air, 3 CoLum. J.
ENvrL. L. 62, 86-87 (1976); Comment, The Legal Conflict Between Smokers and Nonsmokers:
The Majestic Vice Versus the Right to Clean Air, 45 Mo. L. Rav. 444, 470 (1980). Both
articles suggest that battery liability is possible. See generally Reynolds, Extinguishing Brush-
fires: Legal Limits on the Smoking of Tobacco, 53 U. CN. L. REv. 435, 456-58 (1984). But
see Sanford v. Presto Mfg. Co., 92 N. Mex. 746, 594 P.2d 1202 (Ct. App. 1979) (no common-
law battery liability for offensive or dangerous "touching" of the plaintiff by toxic fumes).
91. See Arvidson v. Reynolds Metals Co., 125 F. Supp. 481 (W.D. Wash. 1954), aff'd,
236 F.2d 224 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 968 (1957) (suit for damage from fluorides
discharged from aluminum plants; action described as common-law trespass on the case,
requiring a showing of actual harm, rather than trespass, where at least nominal damages
must be awarded; court denies relief, finding any possible injury to the plaintiffs outweighed
by social and economic importance of defendant's operations). See generally Note, The Viability
of Common Law Actions for Pollution Caused Injuries and Proof of Fact, 18 N.Y.L.F. 935
(1973); Note, Actions for Damages for Air Pollution Injuries, 24 S.C.L. REv. 818 (1972).
92. Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 221 Or. 86, 342 P.2d 790 (1959), cert. denied, 362
U.S. 918 (1960), noted in Note, Trespass: Liability for Invasion by Fluoride Gases, 45 CoRN L
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nuclear science, the court concluded that "mass and energy are equivalents
and that our concept of 'things' must be reframed." 93 An intrusion involving
energy or force was therefore deemed sufficient for trespass liability, re-
gardless of the size or visibility of the intruding agency, and trespass by
fluoride particles was thus found in this case.
94
The court recognized its holding as making trespass subject to somewhat
the same weighing process as had traditionally occurred in nuisance, but
here the weighing was for the purpose of defining the possessor's interest
in exclusive possession, while in nuisance the weighing helps define the
possessor's interest in use and enjoyment.9s A few days prior to the Oregon
court's decision, a federal court applying Oregon law correctly "guessed"
the state court's decision on such facts and ruled that entry by fluorides
and gaseous liquids could be found to be a trespass, at least if some solid
matter was present.Y A few years later, it was considered established that
the settling of fluorides on the plaintiff's land constitutes trespass as a
matter of law i OregonY7 If the settling of such a substance continues, it
becomes a "continuing trespass" and very well may then be a nuisance
also.9s
A number of cases outside Oregon have allowed trespass to lie for an
intangible and/or invisible invasion, such as by dust from a California
cement plant" or lead particulates and sulfoxide gases from an Alabama
smelter.1 ° Conduct that results in the breeding and multiplication of flies
which then enter the plaintiff's premises has been found to be a sufficient
basis for a trespass claim, 01 as has the discharge of encroaching cinders'
2
and the creation of clouds of dust containing invisible particles of silicon
dioxide. 03 All of these cases have basically agreed with Oregon that bulk is
L.Q. 836 (1960); Keeton & Jones, supra note 25, at 259-60; Recent Decision, 35 WASH. L.
Rnv. 474 (1960).
93. Martin, 221 Or. at 93, 342 P.2d at 793.
94. Id. at 94, 342 P.2d at 794.
95. Id. at 96, 34.2 P.2d at 795.
96. Fairview Farms, Inc. v. Reynolds Metals Corp., 176 F. Supp. 178, 186 (D. Or. 1959).
97. Reynolds Metal:; Co. v. Lampert, 324 F.2d 465, 466 (9th Cir. 1963) (settling of fluorides
on land is trespass as a matter of law in Oregon). See generally Annotation, Recovery in
Trespass, supra note 46, at 1054.
98. See Renken v. Harvey Aluminum (Inc.), 226 F. Supp. 169 (D. Or. 1963) (continued
settling of fluorides on the plaintiff's property is continuing trespass in Oregon and may well
be a nuisance).
99. Roberts v. Permanente Corp., 188 Cal. App. 2d 526, 10 Cal. Rptr. 519 (1961).
100. Borland v. Sanders Lead Co., 369 So. 2d 523 (Ala. 1979).
101. Miller v. Carnation Co., 33 Colo. App. 62, 516 P.2d 661 (Ct. App. 1973). The flies,
of course, were visible and tangible but were individually small; the court indicated lack of
bulk was irrelevant.
102. Sheppard Envelope Co. v. Arcade Malleable Iron Co., 335 Mass. 180, 138 N.E.2d 777
(1956).
103. Hall v. De Weld Mica Corp., 244 N.C. 182, 93 S.E.2d 56 (1956); ef. Ingmundson v.
Midland C.R.R., 42 N.D. 455, 173 N.W. 752 (1919) (cause of action for trespass held stated
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immaterial so long as there is entry by some force or energy. However,
some authorities have, while recognizing a possible trespass in the absence
of a tangible, visible entry, relaxed the traditional requirements only if
actual harm is shown.' 4 The mere entry of noise and vibrations has, despite
the obvious presence of force and energy and despite actual damage, gen-
erally been regarded as too far removed from traditional notions of trespass
to support such an action. 05 There is, after all, in such a situation, just the
stirring-up of air waves rather than the emission of some new substance.
There is certainly a stronger argument for trespass when, for instance, a
poisonous substance is sent onto the plaintiff's land' 6 or a fire is allowed
to spread thereto'07 than when energy alone is unleashed. Yet there is even
some authority finding the creation of vibrations sufficient for trespass
liability.'08
In opposition to these developments, it may be argued that nuisance is
the more appropriate remedy for intangible or invisible invasions because
when the plaintiff alleged that railroad damaged his land by causing large volumes of gas,
noxious vapors, smoke, oil, steam, and cinders to be cast on the property).
104. See Gregg v. Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp., 162"Tex. 26, 344 S.W.2d 411 (1961) (gas); Bradley
v. American Smelting & Ref. Co., 104 Wash. 2d 677, 709 P.2d 782 (1985) (particles from
copper smelter); Simmer v. Stephenson, 66 Wash. 2d 477, 403 P.2d 343 (1965) (spark); cf.
Wilson v. Interlake Steel Co., 32 Cal. 3d 229, 649 P.2d 922, 189 Cal. Rptr. 280 (1982) (noise
waves are a trespass only if damage shown); Martin v. Union Pac. R.R., 256 Or. 563, 474
P.2d 739 (1970) (fire). See generally infra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
105. See Celebrity Studios, Inc. v. Civetta Excavating, Inc., 72 Misc. 2d 1077, 340 N.Y.S.2d
694 (Sup. Ct. 1973) (contractor excavating near the plaintiff's property caused damage by
noise and vibrations).
106. See Schronk v. Gilliam, 380 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964) (defendant's aircraft
deposited a poison, intended to be used for spraying cotton on other lands, on the plaintiff's
crops and pasture; actionable trespass held established, with no need to allege negligence).
107. Martin v. Union Pac. R.R., 256 Or. 563, 474 P.2d 739 (1970). Cf. Job Edwards, Ltd.
v. Birmingham Navigations, 1 K.B. 341 (1924) (fire in danger of spreading to neighboring
premises found not a public nuisance; no liability in absence of negligence).
108. See Colton v. Onderdonk, 69 Cal. 155, 10 P. 395 (1886) (trespass for blasting damage);
Gallin v. Poulou, 140 Cal. App. 2d 638, 295 P.2d 958 (1956) (vibration from pile driving);
McNeill v. Redington, 67 Cal. App. 2d 315, 154 P.2d 428 (1944) (trespass for noise and
vibration caused by drop forging plant). When the vibrations result from an explosion or other
occurrence that may be caused by an abnormally dangerous activity, strict liability is another
possible, overlapping theory of liability. See Watson v. Mississippi R. Power Co., 174 Iowa
23, 156 N.W. 188 (1916) (liability for concussion damage without proof of negligence; appears
to apply strict liability for highly dangerous activity); Louden v. Cincinnati, 90 Ohio 144, 106
N.E. 970 (1914) (same). Cf. O'Neill v. San Pedro, L.A. & S.L.R.R., 38 Utah 475, 114 P. 127
(1911) (no tort liability for "jar" caused by passing trains in absence of negligence). But see
Booth v. Rome, W. & O.T.R.R., 140 N.Y. 267, 35 N.E. 592 (1893) (no liability for "jarring"
caused by blasting if due care used). The modem trend is to apply strict liability to blasting
and comparable abnormally dangerous activities even if the harm is caused solely by vibration
or concussion; but there is still a little contrary authority, requiring a physical entry by debris,
etc. in order for strict liability to apply. Compare Exner v. Sherman Power Constr. Co., 54
F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1931) (strict liability for vibration damage from blasting) with Reynolds v.
W. H. Hinman Co., 145 Me. 343, 75 A.2d 802 (1950) (no liability for concussion damage
from blasting unless negligence shown). See generally McNeal, Use of Explosives and Liability
Questions Involved, 23 INs. COUNSEL J. 125 (1956).
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any injury is likely to be only occasional and slight in these cases, and it
is therefore appropriate that the interests of the parties in the use and
enjoyment of their respective properties be balanced in determining whether
or not a tort edst.s.' 9 Undoubtedly, the majority view remains that entry
by dust or fumes or other intangible substances does not suffice for tres-
pass. 10 Casting light on another person's premises has almost universally
been regarded as insufficient for trespass, though amounting to a possible
nuisance."1' Even Oregon has held that verbal insults hurled onto the plain-
tiff's premises do not form the basis of trespass liability." 2 There is certainly
room for argument that the term "nuisance" is often too loosely and
broadly applied and that "[t]he need for a complete analysis and re-
evaluation of the concept of nuisance is apparent.""' It is doubtful, how-
ever, that the situation will be improved by treating traditional situations
of nuisance liability as trespasses, particularly where so many allegations of
nuisance now arise from industrial activity when it may be considered highly
appropriate to dlow the defendant to raise the public interest as a possible
defense to its intrusions."14 Further, even if the activity is found to be a
nuisance, this doe; not comp9l the issuance of an injunction shutting down
the defendant's operation. A court of equity has wide powers to frame an
appropriate remedy, as by denying an injunction but awarding damages, by
issuing a conditional injunction (perhaps dissolvable on the defendant's
payment of damages to the plaintiff), or by issuing an order that the
defendant take certain remedial steps to curtail further harm (noise, light,
odors, or whatever), perhaps conditioned on the plaintiff paying the cost
of such action." 5 Any such relief may be granted against a nuisance.
109. See Annotation, Dust, supra note 64, at 199 (noting cases in which limited, or no,
relief has been given against the creation of dust when the disturbance was only occasional
and the harm slight).
110. See Metzger v. Pennsylvania, Ohio & Detroit R.R., 146 Ohio St. 406, 66 N.E.2d 203
(1946) (smoke); Waschak v. Moffat, 379 Pa. 441, 109 A.2d 310 (1954); cf. Fritz v. E.I. Du
Pont de Nemours & Co., 45 Del. 427, 75 A.2d 256 (1950) (gas and fumes; trespass noted as
possible theory but not adopted); Riblet v. Spokane-Portland Cement Co., 41 Wash. 2d 249,
248 P.2d 380 (1952) (dust from cement plant; nuisance theory adopted). See generally PROSSER
& KOFroN, supra note 1, at 71-72; Annotation, Operation of Cement Plant as Nuisance, 82
A.L.R. 3D 1004, 1014 (1978) [hereinafter Annotation, Cement Plant] (cases in which dust
settled on residential property usually treated as possible nuisances); Annotation, Landowner's
or Occupant's Liability in Damages for Escape, Without Negligence, of Harmful Gases or
Fumes from Premises, 54 A.L.R. 2D 764, 778 (1957) (invasion by gases or odors generally
held not a trespass), Note, Deposit of Wastes, supra note 4, at 879 (industrial dust or noxious
fumes usually found irsufficient for trespass).
111. See Shepler v. Kansas Milling Co., 128 Kan. 554, 278 P. 757 (1929); The Shelburne,
Inc. v. Crossan Corp., 95 N.J. Eq. 188, 122 A. 749 (1923); Amphitheaters, Inc. v. Portland
Meadows, 184 Or. 336, 198 P.2d 847 (1948), all applying the law of nuisance, not trespass,
to offending lights; cf. Akers v. Marsh, 19 App. D.C. 28 (1901) (glare and odor from torch
lamps would not annoy person of ordinary sensibilities and thus was not a nuisance). See
generally Annotation, Casting of Light, supra note 45, at 705.
112. Wilson v. Parent, 228 Or. 354, 365 P.2d 72 (1961).
113. Comment, Nuisance or Negligence, supra note 29, at 402.
114. See Note, Tort., supra note 17, at 122.




Nuisance, whatever the problems created by its broad sweep, does have
certain advantages. It is in accord with the modem tort trend to base
liability not so much "on individual fault, but on a standard of conduct
which is a corollary of social responsibility. '" 6 Indeed, even if fault is still
preferred as a basis of tort liability, it can be argued that nuisance is as
much based on "fault," in the modem sense, as is trespass, because fault
can be found in choosing a location for an activity that creates a likelihood
of the activity unreasonably disturbing other people.1 7 So there seems to
be no compelling reason for reducing the use of nuisance as applied to
intangible invasions or for preferring trespass over nuisance when both are
possible actions.
A compromise between the approaches of either allowing trespass for all
intangible invasions or disallowing it for any such invasion is allowing the
trespass action if, and only if, the invasion is shown to have caused actual
harm - i.e., requiring actual damage as an element of intangible trespass
even though it is not ordinarily required for tangible trespass. This is the
approach taken in a Washington case brought against a copper smelter
whose operations deposited airborne particles on the plaintiff's property.'
A few other authorities appear to support this approach." 9 Just as the
Oregon court has sometimes redefined trespass so as to require some degree
of balancing in the determination of liability, thus bringing the trespass
action closer to nuisance,'" so the Washington court is here redefining
trespass in the intangible entry cases so as to require something that is not
normally a requisite of that action: actual harm.
While many of the above-discussed cases involved attempts to find trespass
liability when nuisance might more easily be established, there are also cases
that seem to bend over backward to achieve the opposite result - to apply
nuisance law despite the clear presence of a tangible, visible invasion of
possessory rights. Thus, when a water supply was contaminated by the
defendant's knowingly allowing pollutants to be introduced into it,121 or
when a landowner caused water to percolate or seep onto adjoining land,'2
116. Note, Nuisance, Negligence and the Overlapping of Torts, 3 MOD. L. REv. 305, 309
(1940).
117. See Keeton, Trespass, supra note 4, at 458; cf. Jost v. Dairyland Power Coop., 45
Wis. 2d 164, 172 N.W.2d 647 (1969) (defendant emitted gases into atmosphere near the
plaintiffs' farms; could be nuisance despite defendant's conforming to industry standards of
due care).
118. Bradley v. American Smelting & Ref. Co., 104 Wash. 2d 677, 709 P.2d 782 (1985).
119. See Gregg v. Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp., 162 Tex. 26, 344 S.W.2d 411 (1961) (gas); Zimmer
v. Stephenson, 66 Wash. 2d 477, 403 P.2d 343 (1965) (spark); cf. Wilson v. Interlake Steel
Co., 32 Cal. 3d 229, 649 P.2d 922, 185 Cal. Rptr. 280 (1982) (noise waves).
120. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
121. Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901) (dumping of sewerage into canal which
eventually emptied into river supplying water for city in another state); Burr v. Adams
Eidemiller, Inc., 386 Pa. 416, 126 A.2d 403 (1956). See generally Annotation, Federal Common
Law of Nuisances as Basis for Relief in Environmental Pollution Cases, 29 A.L.R. FED. 137
(1976) [hereinafter Annotation, Law of Nuisances].
122. See Healey v. Citizens Gas & EIec. Co., 199 Iowa 82, 201 N.W. 118 (1924); Aldworth
v. City of Lynn, 153 Mass. 53, 26 N.E. 229 (1891); cf. Humble Pipeline Co. v. Anderson,
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some courts have applied the law of nuisance. Intentional flooding of the
plaintiff's farmland '23 and leakage of gasoline into the plaintiff's well' 24
have been ruled nuisances, and trespass liability has been rejected. Similar
treatments have been accorded the diversion of a stream, resulting in the
deposit of sand and rocks on the plaintiff's land'7- or simply causing an
overflow of water onto the plaintiff's land.' 26 In all these situations, there
clearly was an intentionally-caused tangible, visible invasion of the plaintiff's
premises; yet each court rejected or ignored the trespass possibility, prefer-
ring nuisance.
Practical Effects of Using One Tort or the Other
What difference does it make to the parties whether a cause of action
for trespass or for nuisance is alleged? One obvious difference - and one
that sometimes forces courts to choose between the two actions - is when
the statute of limitations starts to run. With trespass, the statute will begin
to run from the moment of the physical invasion. With nuisance, the period
will commence with the unreasonable and substantial interference with the
plaintiff's use and enjoyment of real property.'27 Pinpointing the start of
the statute's running may obviously be more difficult when nuisance is
involved, since the action cannot be said to have accrued at a precise
moment. It is a matter of judgment as to when, if at all, the interference
became unreasonable and substantial.' 28 Courts have often been lenient,
however, in applying the statute of limitations to nuisance actions -
339 S.W.2d 259 (rex. Civ. App. 1960) (leaking of oil from pipeline and its percolation to
land of another was, a:; a matter of law, insufficient for trespass - but defendant may not
have known of the leakage). But see, applying trespass theory, Conner v. Woodfill, 126 Ind.
85, 25 N.E. 876 (1890) (water flowed from defendant's to the plaintiff's premises); City of
Barberton v. Miksch, 128 Ohio St. 169, 190 N.E. 387 (1934) (defendant knew that his conduct
was making the plaintiff's land wet and soggy; could be trespass liability).
123. Haenchen v. San Prods. Co., 626 P.2d 332 (Okla. Ct. App. 1981) (defendants's dam
blocked natural surface water drainage; nuisance found).
124. Pan Am. Petroleum Co. v. Byars, 228 Ala. 372, 153 So. 616 (1934) (cause of action
stated in case but not trespass).
125. Wright v. Syracuse, B. & N.Y.R. Co., 49 Hun. 445, 3 N.Y.S. 480 (1888), aff'd, 124
N.Y. 668, 27 N.E. 854 (1891).
126. Central of Ga. Ry. v. Americus Constr. Co., 133 Ga. 392, 65 S.E. 855 (1909).
127. See Fairlawn Cemetery Ass'n v. First Presbyterian Church, 496 P.2d 1185 (Okla. 1972).
Leading cases holding that the statute on trespass runs from the time of invasion include
National Copper Co. v. Minnesota Mining Co., 57 Mich. 83, 23 N.W. 781 (1885); Williams
v. Pomeroy Coal Co., 37 Ohio St. 583 (1882). Leading cases on the nuisance statute running
from the time of the required harm include Hooker v. Farmers' Irrigation Dist., 272 F. 600
(8th Cir. 1921); Heckaman v. Northern Pac. Ry., 93 Mont. 363, 20 P.2d 258 (1933). See
generally Note, Limitation of Actions - Accrual of Cause of Action - Injuries to Land, 21
MINN. L. Rv. 334 (1937).
128. See Thackery v. Union Portland Cement Co., 64 Utah 437, 231 P. 813 (1924) (recurring
annoyance by dust and smoke from cement plant; extent of annoyance depended on extent to




allowing damages, if the nuisance is a continuing one, for the statutory
period preceding the filing of suit, even though the unreasonable interference
had been occurring for a much longer period. 2 9 Courts also allow damages
for the permanent injury to the use and enjoyment of the property if the
nuisance is a recurring one, even though it had been recurring at intervals
for longer than the statutory period. 3 0 In trespass, a stricter view is some-
times taken, with the court denying money damages, or any comparable
relief, once the statutory period has elapsed from the time of the original
entry. 3' Aside from the difference as to the time of commencement of the
statute's running, a jurisdiction may simply have different statutory periods
for the torts of trespass and nuisance. The trespass period is longer in some
jurisdictions, again reflecting the seriousness with which the law has histor-
ically regarded intentional invasions of real property.' 32 Sometimes nuisance
is governed by old statutory provisions regarding the limitations period for
actions of "trespass on the case," and these tend to be shorter than the
period for trespass on realty and other actions growing out of the writ of
trespass. 1
Another practical difference between the two actions is the aforementioned
fact 34 that liability in trespass follows automatically from the intentional
invasion of the real property of another,13' while nuisance liability does not
follow ipso facto from intentional interference with use and enjoyment but
only if the interference is judged substantial and unreasonable. 36 This means
that nuisance liability involves "a weighing process - the broad balancing
129. See Haenchen v. Sand Prods. Co., 626 P.2d 332 (Okla. Ct. App. 1981) (owner of
flooded land could recover damages in nuisance for the two years preceding filing of suit); cf.
Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 39 Cal. 3d 862, 705 P.2d 866, 212 Cal.
Rptr. 293 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1017 (1986) (homeowners living adjacent to airport
could elect to treat noise and vibrations as continuing nuisance, rather than permanent nuisance,
and thus avoid statute-of-limitations problem).
130. See Thackery v. Union Portland Cement Co., 64 Utah 437, 231 P. 813 (1924).
131. See Fairlawn Cemetery Ass'n v. First Presbyterian Church, 496 P.2d 1185 (Okla. 1972)
(encroachment of piling dirt on the plaintiff's land was trespass, not nuisance; two-year statute
of limitations on trespass barred any claim for damages or for relief in the nature of damages,
such as requiring defendant to remedy the harm done). Often, however, the courts will regard
such an encroachment as a continuing trespass for which the statute begins anew each day
that the defendant falls to remedy the invasion. See 509 Sixth Ave. Corp. v. New York City
Transit Auth., 15 N.Y.2d 48, 255 N.Y.S.2d 89, 203 N.E.2d 486 (1964); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)
OF TORTS § 161 (1964).
132. See Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 221 Or. 86, 342 P.2d 790 (1959), cert. denied, 362
U.S. 918 (1960) (six-year statutory period on actions for trespass to land; two-year statutory
period for nontrespassory injuries to land).
133. See Arvidson v. Reynolds Metals Co., 125 F. Supp. 481 (D. Wash. 1954), aff'd, 236
F.2d 224 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 968 (1957); Bradley v. American Smelting &
Ref. Co., 104 Wash. 2d 677, 709 P.2d 782 (1985) (three-year period for actions for waste or
trespass on realty; two-year period for actions on the case).
134. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
135. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, at 67.
136. See id. at 623, noting that it is not defendant's conduct that must be unreasonable for
nuisance liability but rather the interference with the plaintiff's use and enjoyment of his real
property.
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of interests between the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct and the
gravity of the landowner's injury."' 7 Thus, a number of cases note that in
nuisance, social considerations are relevant, and the court is justified in
denying relief on the ground that any harm to the plaintiff is outweighed
by the social utility of the defendant's conduct.'
In trespass, on the other hand, no general defense of social utility exists.
Only the very limited defenses of self-defense, defense of others, necessity,
etc. that are customarily applicable to the intentional torts, are available.'
Nuisance, unlike trespass, requires the consideration of a wide variety of
factors. If noise that disturbs sleep is the alleged basis of the action, it is
crucial to consider such matters as the number of persons disturbed thereby,
the public value of the activities creating the noise, and whether the noise's
presence is more-or-less permanent or merely temporary, as when associated
with construction work of limited duration. 14 The basic question must be
whether the noise constitutes an unreasonable disturbance; unusually sen-
sitive or nervous persons will be denied relief and told they "must seek
refuse in sound proof rooms, if they can afford them, or take their chances
of the padded cell,.'
141
Of course, if the noise is created by conduct that is not considered
essential, such as sports or recreational activity, a stricter standard will be
applied to those who create the noise, 42 and the disturbance may be found
unreasonable even though it is otherwise perfectly lawful 43 and even though
it is not the only such disturbance in the neighborhood.'" If, however, the
noise or other disturbance is caused by an enterprise of great benefit to the
public and the economy, a finding of unreasonableness, and thus of nui-
sance, may be very difficult to obtain, as in the case of airport operations. 4
137. Note, Torts, supra note 17, at 117.
138. See Dixon v. New York Trap Rock Corp., 293 N.Y. 509, 513, 58 N.E.2d 517, 518
(1944); Booth v. Rome, W. & O.T.R.R., 140 N.Y. 267 (1893); Waschak v. Moffat, 379 Pa.
441, 448, 109 A.2d 310, 314 (1954), Pregrad v. Ocean Coal Co., 14 Pa. D. & C. 438 (C.P.
1927).
139. See Note, Deposit of Wastes, supra note 4, at 878-79 (noting that defenses may be
available if an invasion was intended to save life or property or was necessary to permit a
vital public activity).
140. See Wheat Culvert Co. v. Jenkins, 246 Ky. 319, 55 S.W.2d 4 (1932); Deevers v. Land,
220 Mo. App. 50, 235 S.W. 746 (1926); Seligman v. Victor Talking Mach. Co., 71 N.J. Eq.
697, 63 A. 1093 (19O6); Andrews v. Perry, 127 Misc. 320, 216 N.Y.S. 537 (Sup. Ct. 1926);
Phelps v. Mayor, 2 Ch. 255 (1916). See generally Lloyd, Noise as a Nuisance, 82 U. PA. L.
REv. 567, 572-73 (1934).
141. Lloyd, supra note 140, at 582; see Smilie v. Taft Stadium Bd. of Control, 201 Okla.
303, 205 P.2d 301 (1949) (denying an injunction against a midget automobile race track, the
noise from which was alleged to disturb the plaintiffs; others living in the area testified,
however, that they did not find the noise bothersome).
142. See First Methodist Episcopal Church v. Cape May Grain & Coal Co., 72 N.J. Eq.
257, 67 A. 613 (1907). See generally Note, Nuisance: Noise and the Queue, 4 OuA. L. Riy.
501 (1951).
143. See Meadowbrook Swimming Club v. Albert, 173 Md. 641, 644, 197 A. 146, 147 (1938)
(noise from "amusement place").
144. See Hobson v. Walker, 41 So. 2d 789 (La. Ct. App. 1949).




The balancing of interests inherent in nuisance has been cited as a reason
why the nuisance theory has come to be considered more appropriate than
trespass in aviation cases.' 46 While balancing often makes it difficult to
establish nuisance liability - and certainly to obtain injunctive relief -
against a large public airport, relief, even an injunction, is sometimes
possible against a private airstrip, the social value of which may be consid-
ered rather limited. 147 In any case, the "formalistic trespass analysis" has
now largely been abandoned in the airport-noise cases in favor of the
balancing analysis of nuisance. 148
As the noise cases illustrate, the test that the plaintiff must meet in
establishing the unreasonableness necessary to nuisance is the effect of the
alleged nuisance on a normal person of ordinary habits and sensibilities.
The effect on an abnormally sensitive person or unusually sensitive use of
property is irrelevant.' 49 Thus, it may be difficult for a landowner whose
use of his property is particularly sensitive to light - as is a drive-in movie
theater, for instance - to obtain relief against the defendant creating the
light. 150 Similarly, plaintiffs attempting to make use of solar energy may
have little success obtaining relief against someone blocking their access to
this source."'
v. Commonwealth, 176 Va. 109, 10 S.E.2d 529 (1940). See generally Annotation, Airport
Operations, supra note 30, at 253. Some common-law nuisance actions seeking relief for airport
noise may have been preempted by the federal Noise Control Act of 1972, establishing an
administrative scheme to control noise. Noise Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-574, 86
Stat. 1234 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4901-4918 (1988)); see City of Burbank v.
Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973); Note, Aircraft Noise Abatement: Is There
Room for Local Regulation?, 60 Coimua L. REv. 269 (1975). See generally Note, Environ-
mental Law - The Noise Control Act of 1972, 27 OxLA. L. Rnv. 44 (1974). However, the
federal preemption may apply only against local regulation of a privately owned airport, not
a governmentally owned one. See Greater Westchester Homeowners Ass'n v. City of Los
Angeles, 26 Cal. 3d 86, 603 P.2d 1329, 160 Cal. Rptr. 733 (1979) (finding that federal
preemption did not bar a nuisance suit for noise from a city-owned airport); Note, The
Concorde and Local Control of Airport Noise: Federal Preemption?, 13 NEw ENG. L. REv.
473 (1978). See generally Lesser, The Aircraft Noise Problems: The Past Decade - Still Federal
Power and, at Least for a While Longer, Local Liability, 13 URBAN LAW. 285 (1981).
146. See Swetiand v. Curtiss Airports Corp., 41 F.2d 929 (N.D. Ohio 1930), modified, 55
F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1932); Atkinson v. Bernard, Inc., 223 Or. 624, 355 P.2d 229 (1960).
147. See Seagraves v. Portland City Temple, 269 Or. 28, 522 P.2d 893 (1974) (private
airstrip enjoined due to substantial interference caused by noise).
148. Note, Airplane Noise, supra note 67, at 1583 (commenting that "[m]ost courts faced
with the question find it unnecessary to pass upon the trespass allegation and decide the
liability issue solely in terms of nuisance."). See Mace, supra note 65, at 343.
149. See Amphitheaters, Inc. v. Portland Meadows, 184 Or. 336, 198 P.2d 847 (1948), noted
in Recent Cases, 62 HARv. L. Rnv. 704 (1949); Recent Decisions, 24 NoTRE DAME LAW. 254
(1949); Recent Cases, 28 OR. L. Ray. 193 (1949).
150. Id. (denying damages to a drive-in movie theater for the harm caused its business by
defendant horse-race track's casting of light, through the use of numerous floodlights, on the
theater's screen). See generally Holzer, And Then There Was Light - Light as a Nuisance,
51 Cm. B. REc. 403 (1970).
151. See Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc., 114 So. 2d 357, 359
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Yet as the use and economic importance of solar energy increase, relief
under nuisance law may become more likely because the social importance
will be considered greater and the use will no longer be regarded as peculiarly
sensitive. 52 Nuisance law has a flexibility that allows activities once consid-
ered reasonable to become unreasonable, and vice versa, and that also
allows changes over the years as to the relief - damages, injunction, etc.
- that is considered justified.5 3 Increasing concern for the environment is
likely to be reflected in many cases in the near future; but even when the
environment is threatened, it has sometimes been held appropriate to weigh
the interests of both sides in a dispute. 154 The location of an alleged nuisance
is of particular importance in most nuisance cases, and a person living or
owning property in a basically industrial area is not entitled to the same
degree of protection as a person in a predominantly residential neighbor-
hood. 5
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959). See also Comment, Obstruction of Sunlight as a Private Nuisance,
65 CALIF. L. REV. 94 (1977). See generally Williams, Solar Access and Property Rights: A
Maverick Analysis, 11 CoNN. L. REv. 430 (1979).
152. See Goble, Solar Access and Property Rights: Reply to a "Maverick" Analysis, 12
CoNN. L. REV. 270, 286-90 (1980). See also Comment, Designs on Sunshine: Solar Access in
the United States and Japan, 10 CoNN. L. REV. 123 (1977). See generally Ben-David, Schulze,
Balcomb, Katson, Noll, Roach & Thayer, Near Term Prospects for Solar Energy: An Economic
Analysis, 17 NAT. REsovRcEs J. 169 (1977); Zillman & Deeny, Legal Aspects of Solar Energy
Development, 1976 Aiuz. ST. L.J. 25.
153. See Polinsky, supra note 32, at 1076-77 (applying to a pollution situation the analysis
of Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the
Cathedral, 85 HAgv. L. REv. 1089 (1972)). See also, applying the same authors' analysis to a
situation of light as a possible nuisance (as in the Amphitheaters case at supra note 149),
Rabin, supra note 115, at 1299-1300.
154. See Harrisonville v. W.S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 289 U.S. 334 (1933) (discharge of
sewage into creek); Sussex Land & Live Stock Co. v. Midwest Ref. Co., 294 F. 597 (8th Cir.
1923) (crude oil allowed to escape into creek); cf. Virginians for Dulles v. Volpe, 344 F. Supp.
573 (D. Va. 1972) (noise created by aircraft landing and taking off from airport). But cf.
Crushed Stone Co. v. Moore, 369 P.2d 811, 815-16 (Okla. 1962) (operation of quarry
constituted nuisance; when damages at law will not give adequate remedy to the plaintiffs who
are caused substantial and irremediable injury by nuisance, the plaintiffs are entitled as a
matter of right to an injunction regardless of comparative benefits or comparative injury
resulting therefrom). See generally Annotation, Law of Nuisances, supra note 121, at 137
(discussing in § 5(a) cases in which balancing the equities was held appropriate in environmental
disputes in which an injunction was sought and discussing in § 5(b) cases in which such
balancing was considered inappropriate).
155. See, for instance, some of the cases involving cement plants as alleged nuisances:
Asphalt Prods. Co. v. Beard, 189 Ga. 610, 7 S.E.2d 172 (1940) (no nuisance when no allegation
that plant was not in a manufacturing area); Reed v. Cook Constr. Co., 336 So. 2d 724 (Miss.
1976) (emphasizing character of neighborhood); Pelletier v. Transit-Mix Concrete Corp., 11
Misc. 2d 617, 174 N.Y.S.2d 794 (Sup. Ct. 1958) (injunction not justified if property located
in business and industrial section of city). Cf. Frank v. Cossitt Cement Prods., 197 Misc. 670,
97 N.Y.S.2d 337 (1950) (degree of noise which may be nuisance in rural area may be considered
inevitable in an urban setting). Compare Powell v. Superior Portland Cement, Inc., 15 Wash.
2d 14, 129 P.2d 536 (1912) (denying relief when the plaintiff knowingly purchased residence
in industrial town and nimr defendant's plant) with Riblet v. Spokane-Portland Cement Co.,
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol44/iss2/3
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To what extent does the plaintiff's own conduct enter into the balancing
process in nuisance? While there has been considerable confusion as to the
availability of contributory (or comparative) negligence as a defense in
nuisance, generally the defense is available if the nuisance action is based
on negligence but not if it is founded on intent or strict liability. 15 6 Some
authorities state that contributory (or comparative) negligence is a defense
if the nuisance is based on negligence but not if it is an absolute nuisance,
an annoyance that causes unreasonable disturbance even though the defen-
dant is conducting the activity with due care.157 It has been noted that the
first case in which the doctrine of contributory negligence was applied was
in fact a nuisance case.
58
Assumption of the risk is also a possible defense in nuisance cases based
on negligence. Thus, the plaintiff may be denied relief for an injury if he
knowingly and voluntarily undertook the risk of being so injured by the
nuisance. 59 Even in cases of nuisance based on intentional conduct, such
as flooding, the plaintiff has sometimes been denied relief for harm to his
property that aould have been averted by due care and with little effort or
expense on his part.160
One defense often asserted in nuisance cases is "coming to the nuisance."
This defense may be considered a variant on assumption of the risk in that
it involves the assertion that the plaintiff moved, or developed his property,
near the defendant's alleged nuisance after the nuisance already existed and
therefore should not be heard to complain of it.' 6' The attempted defense
41 Wash. 2d 249, 248 P.2d 380 (1952) (error to dismiss complaint against cement plant when
the plaintiff's property was clearly residential; distinguishing Powell). See generally Annotation,
Cement Plant, supra note 110, at 1004.
156. See Comment, Nuisance or Negligence, supra note 29, at 406 (with review of the
authorities). The leading case is McFarlane v. Niagara Falls, 247 N.Y. 340, 160 N.E. 391
(1928). See generally Annotation, Contributory Negligence or Assumption of Risk as Defense
to Action for Damages for Nuisance - Modern Views, 73 A.L.R. 2D 1378 (1960) [hereinafter
Annotation, Modern Views]
157. See Terrell v. Alabama Water Serv. Co., 245 Ala. 68, 72, 15 So. 2d 727, 730-31 (1943);
Timmons v. Reed, 569 P.2d 112, 123 (Wyo. 1977). See generally 66 C.J.S. Nuisances § 11(b),
at 755 (1950).
158. See Comment, Contributory Negligence, supra note 31, at 564 (citing the leading
contributory negligence case of Butterfield v. Forrester, 11 East. 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (1809)).
See generally Comment, Contributory Negligence as a Defense to Nuisance, 29 ILL. L. REv.
372 (1934).
159. See Comment, Contributory Negligence, supra note 31, at 568-69 (assumption of risk
may be defense even against an absolute nuisance); Annotation, Modern Views, supra note
156, at 1399.
160. See Crommelin v. Coxe & Co., 30 Ala. 318 (1857) (the plaintiff was injured by water
improperly released on his land when the plaintiff could easily have prevented the harm);
Lisko v. Uhren, 134 Ark. 430, 204 S.W. 101 (1918) (same); Morrison v. Queen City E.L. &
P. Co., 193 Mich. 604, 160 N.W. 434 (1916) (same); Galveston, H. & S.A. Ry. v. Ware, 67
Tex. 635, 4 S.W. 13 (1887) (same); Jenkins v. Stephens, 71 Utah 15, 262 P. 274 (1927) (same).
See generally Seavey, supra note 27, at 989.
161. See Crime in Tort Law, supra note 7, at 338. See generally Note, Torts: Nuisance:
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is thus based on priority in time. In public nuisance, this is generally agreed
not to be a defense at all, since by definition the nuisance involves a
violation of criminal law. In private nuisance, "coming to the nuisance"
does not necessarily prevent the plaintiff from obtaining relief (unless he
came for the sole purpose of a vexatious lawsuit) but is a relevant factor
to weigh in the balancing process of deciding what, if any, relief the plaintiff
may obtain. 62 "Coming to the nuisance" often overlaps other factors
employed in the balancing, such as consideration of the basic nature of the
area in which the alleged nuisance is located' 63 and the promptness with
which the plaintiff has sought relief.64 There is also the overlapping pos-
sibility that the defendant may have acquired prescriptive rights to operate
the alleged nuisance, but such fights are acquired only if the use has been
adverse as to the plaintiff for the prescribed statutory period. 65
Another difference in what the plaintiff must prove, depending on whether
he alleges trespass or nuisance, concerns the basis of liability. Trespass is
an intentional tort, though the intent required is minimal. The requisite
intent is to be at the place where the trespass occurred, not the intent to
cause any resulting harm.16 Thus, there may be trespass liability even if the
defendant in good faith came upon the real property believing it to be his
own'67 or believing he had the owner's permission to be there. 68 However,
if the defendant had no intent to be, in person or through some agency, at
the place of the alleged trespass, there can be no trespass liability but rather
only liability for negligence or (if an abnormally dangerous activity is
Defenses: "Coming to the Nuisance" as a Defense, 41 CALF. L. REv. 148 (1953); Note, Torts
- Nuisance - "Coming to the Nuisance," 32 OR. L. Rav. 264 (1953).
162. See Crime in Tort Law, supra note 7, at 338-39.
163. See Nuisance as a Tort, supra note 10, at 200-01.
164. See Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur Copper & Iron Co., 113 Tenn. 331, 83 S.W. 658
(1904) (delay of ten years in complaining of nuisance prevented relief in equity when defendants
had in meantime spent large sums increasing their operation).
165. See Stouts Mountains Coal & Coke Co. v. Ballard, 195 Ala. 283, 70 So. 172 (1915);
Fansler v. City of Sedalia, 189 Mo. App. 454, 176 S.W. 1102 (1915); North Point Consol.
Irrigation Co. v. Utah & Salt Lake Canal Co., 16 Utah 246, 52 P. 168 (1898); Koch v. Eastern
Gas & Fuel Assocs., 142 W. Va. 386, 95 S.E.2d 822 (1956).
166. See REsTAT MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 163 comment b (1964); PRossSR & KEETON,
supra note 1, at 73. But cf. Miller v. Carnation Co., 33 Colo. App. 62, 516 P.2d 661 (Ct.
App. 1973) (one who sets in motion a force that in normal course of events would cause
damage to property of amother may be held liable in trespass).
167. Maye v. Yappen, 23 Cal. 306 (1863); Bihm v. Hirsch, 193 So. 2d 865 (La. App. 1967);
Alabama Great So. R.R. v. Broach, 238 Miss. 618, 119 So. 2d 923 (1960). See generally
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 164 (1964).
168. Anderson v. United States, 259 F. Supp. 148 (E.D. Pa. 1966); Southern Counties Ice
Co. v. RKO Radio Pictures, 39 F. Supp. 157 (S.D. Cal. 1941); Serota v. M. & M. Utils.,
Inc., 55 Misc. 2d 286, 285 N.Y.S.2d 121 (Civ. Ct. 1967). The same is true when a defendant
mistakenly claims a legal privilege to be on the property. Connor v. Greenberg, 198 Iil. App.
129 (1916); Blatt v. McBarron, 161 Mass. 21, 36 N.E. 468 (1894). It is also true when the
defendant is too young to understand the wrongfulness of the conduct. Brown v. Dellinger,




present) strict liability, as held in a case in which the defendant accidentally
allowed gasoline to seep from his land onto his neighbor's property. 169 In
such a case, there will then ordinarily be liability only for a lack of due
care; but if the requisite intent for trespass liability is present, due care is
no defense. 170 Liability for private nuisance, on the other hand, can tradi-
tionally be founded on any one of the three principal bases of tort liability:
intent, negligence, or, if an abnormally dangerous activity is pursued, strict
liability.17'
It has sometimes been stated sweepingly that negligence is unnecessary to
nuisance. 7 2 However, it has also been pointed out that negligence is, in
fact, very often present in nuisance cases and may be considered a requisite
to nuisance liability except in those cases in which the defendant is aware
of the harmful effects of his conduct (so that intent to disturb may be
found) or when the activity is so dangerous as to justify strict liability.
73
In many nuisance cases, liability can, however, be based on intent because
the requisite intent is present in the eyes of the law not only when the
defendant acts with the purpose of causing an interference with the plaintiff's
use and enjoyment of his real property but also when the defendant knows
that the interference is resulting from his conduct or knows that it is
substantially certain to result. 74 Thus, it seems accurate to conclude that
"negligence is merely one type of conduct which may give rise to a nui-
sance. 1 75 Whether the basis is negligence or some other theory will then
determine the defenses that are available.
7 6
If the basis is negligence, the action, though it may be termed a "negligent
nuisance," is really no more than an ordinary negligence action in nuisance
clothing and should be treated as such.1 77 Accordingly, it has been urged
that nuisance itself should now be regarded, aside from rare situations of
strict liability and aside from occasional statutory modifications, 78 as exclu-
169. Hudson v. Peavey Oil Co., 279 Or. 3, 566 P.2d 175 (1977) (no liability for an
unintentional "trespass" unless was negligence or an extrahazardous activity involved).
170. See Roberts v. Permanente Corp., 188 Cal. App. 2d 526, 10 Cal. Rptr. 519 (1961).
171. Timmons v. Reed, 569 P.2d 112, 123 (Wyo. 1977).
172. See District of Columbia v. Totten, 5 F.2d 374 (D.C. Cir. 1925); Brenan v. lannotti,
64 R.I. 469, 175 A. 656 (1934); Soap Corp. of Am. v. Balis, 223 S.W.2d 957 (Tex. Civ. App.
1949); G. L. Webster Co. v. Steelman, 172 Va. 342, 1 S.E.2d 305 (1939).
173. Seavey, supra note 27, at 987-88.
174. See Morgan v. High Penn Oil Co., 238 N.C. 185, 77 S.E.2d 682 (1953); Stanolind Oil
& Gas Co. v. Smith, 290 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
175. Jost v. Dairyland Power Coop., 45 Wis. 2d 164, 170, 172 N.W.2d 647, 650 (1969)
(quoting W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTs 594 (3d ed. 1964)).
176. See Comment, Nuisance or Negligence, supra note 29, at 406. The comment states:
It is apparent that the key to the problem of the availability of the defense of
contributory negligence in actions for injuries to person or chattels arising out
of nuisance should be the determination of the type of conduct bringing the
nuisance about, i.e., whether the nuisance was caused by negligence or by some
other type of tortious conduct.
Id.
177. See Comment, Contributory Negligence, supra note 31, at 562-63.
178. Example of statutory modification may be found in some statutes and ordinances, or
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sively an intentional tort, requiring that the defendant have the purpose of
causing unreasonable and substantial interference with the plaintiff's use
and enjoyment of his real property or the knowledge or substantial certainty
that such interference will result from the defendant's activity. 179 This would
put an end to the confusing "hybrid action of nuisance and negligence"'' 0
and would make clear that while in negligence the plaintiff must show that
the defendant was under a duty of due care, no such duty need be established
in nuisance.' This would also, of course, move nuisance and trespass closer
together, because nuisance would become, as trespass has long been, an
exclusively intentional tort.
There is another difference, however, in the requisites of liability for
nuisance and for trespass, aside from the underlying theory of fault. In
nuisance, unlike trespass, actual harm must be shown.1 2 Indeed, the harm
in nuisance must be unreasonable and substantial.' On the other hand, at
least nominal damages will be awarded in trespass for any unprivileged
entry on or use of real property.'14
Various reasons have been advanced for allowing the trespass action
without proof of actual damage: to prevent the acquisition of prescriptive
administrative regulations promulgated thereunder, dealing with air pollution. See Annotation,
Necessity of Showing Scienter, Knowledge, or Intent, in Prosecution for Violation of Air
Pollution or Smoke Control Statute or Ordinance, 46 A.L.R. 3D 758 (1972).
179. See PRossER & KEaTON, supra note 1, at 624 (terming it "highly desirable" that
nuisance be limited to intentional interferences).
180. Winfield, The History of Negligence in the Law of Torts, 42 LAw Q. Rv. 184, 197-
98 (1926) (discussed and further explained in Nuisance as a Tort, supra note 10, at 198).
181. Nuisance as a Tort, supra note 10, at 198.
182. See id. at 203; (f. Keesling v. City of Seattle, 52 Wash. 2d 247, 324 P.2d 806 (1958)
(technical trespass gives rise to nominal damages even if no actual harm was done).
183. See Patterson v. Peabody Coal Co., 3 Ill. App. 2d 311, 122 N.E.2d 48 (1954); Garden
v. International Shoe Co., 319 Ill. App. 416, 49 N.E.2d 328 (1943), aff'd, 386 Il. 418, 54
N.E.2d 543 (1944); Booth v. Rome, W. & O.T.R.R., 140 N.Y. 267, 35 N.E. 592 (1893). See
generally PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, at 622-23; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822
(1977).
184. See Giddings v. Rogalewski, 192 Mich. 319, 158 N.W. 951 (1916); Hall v. De Weld
Mica Corp., 244 N.C. 182, 93 S.E.2d 56 (1956); Lee v. Stewart, 218 N.C. 287, 10 S.E.2d 804
(1940); Dougherty v. Stepp, 18 N.C. (1 Dev. & Bat.) 371 (1835); Davis v. Georgia-Pacific
Corp., 251 Or. 239, 445 P.2d 481 (1968); Thackery v. Union Portland Cement Co., 64 Utah
437, 231 P. 813 (1924); Riblet v. Spokane-Portland Cement Co., 41 Wash. 2d 249, 248 P.2d
380 (1952); Bartlett v. Grasselli Chem. Co., 92 W. Va. 445, 115 S.E. 451 (1922). See generally
Keeton, Trespass, supra note 4 ; PROSSER AND KETON, supra note 1, at 70, 75. It has been
held that there is trespass liability even if the plaintiff actually benefited from the trespass.
Longenecker v. Zimmerman, 175 Kan. 719, 267 P.2d 543 (1954); Harmony Ditch Co. v.
Sweeney, 31 Wyo. 1, 222 P. 577 (1924).
It should be observed, however, that there is a trend toward requiring actual damage in
trespass, as shown by a few limited groups of cases: those in which the plaintiff holds only a
future interest in the land (see infra note 196 and accompanying text); those (under a
"compromise," and minority, view) in which there is no tangible, visible invasion (see supra
notes 118-20 and accompanying text); and those (often treated as nuisance cases) in which the
invasion is above or below the surface (see supra notes 65-83 and accompanying text).
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rights; to settle disputes regarding title to land; to vindicate property rights;
and to prevent breaches of the peace."' All of these grounds have been
said to flow from the underlying idea that an owner of real property should
have the right to prevent others from using the property without his con-
sent. 8 6 Once again, the requirement of harm in nuisance but not in trespass
would seem to show the seriousness with which the common law regarded
unauthorized physical invasions.8 7 Additionally, the requirement of harm
may also show some continued life in the old notion that trespass involves
a more direct injury than does nuisance.'s Thus, a 1979 case stated that
"[i]f the intrusion is direct, then, under our present law, actual damages
need not be shown ...."189
It should be emphasized that while nuisance is usually said to require
unreasonable harm (i.e., unreasonable interference with the plaintiff's use
and enjoyment of his real property), this requirement relates purely to the
extent of the damage, not to the defendant's conduct. It does not impose
any requirement of unreasonable (i.e., negligent) conduct on the defendant's
part. 19 The damage is required to be unreasonable in light of all the factors
weighed in the aforementioned balancing process that is employed in nui-
sance law,' 9' the balancing process that some authorities have now introduced
into trespass analysis. 192
Another difference between what must be proven in actions of trespass
and in actions of nuisance concerns the estate or interest owned by the
plaintiff in the relevant real property. Because trespass involves an interfer-
ence with possession, the plaintiff must show a possessory interest in the
185. See Keeton & Jones, supra note 25, at 256-57. See generally T. SIRanT, supra note 8,
at 25.
186. See Keeton & Jones, supra note 25, at 257.
187. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
188. See Note, Torts - Remedy for Trespass Where No Injury is Shown, 39 Ky. L.J. 99,
102 (1950) (implied damages are granted in trespass on theory that every direct entry results
in some material injury). See generally Keeton, Trespass, supra note 4, at 464-65. See also D.
DOBBS, REMEDres 332-35 (1973) (stating that indirect physical entries, such as by percolating
waters, are often treated as possible nuisances but not trespasses, perhaps because of the lack
of direct application of force).
189. Borland v. Sanders Lead Co., 369 So. 2d 523, 529 (Ala. 1979) (stating that while the
direct/indirect analysis is no longer used by that court to distinguish trespass from nuisance,
it is used to determine the elements necessary for trespass; if the intrusion is direct, no actual
harm need be shown, but if it is indirect, substantial harm must be established. "Indirect
intrusion" thus seems to lead in Alabama to the equivalent of nuisance liability, though it
may be called "trespass.").
190. See Annotation, Cement Plant, supra note 110, at 1004, 1007 (noting that the fact that
an enterprise is well equipped and operated efficiently does not prevent nuisance liability if it
nonetheless unreasonably interferes with other persons).
191. See supra notes 137-48 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 92-103 and accompanying text.
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real property.' 93 A mere easement' 94 or license 9 will not suffice. The holder
of a future possessory estate, such as a landlord owning a reversionary
interest, may recover for harm to his estate, but his action is derived from
the old writ of trespass on the case and he must, contrary to the usual rule
of trespass actions, show actual harm to his interest.' 96 In private nuisance,
the rules are somewhat more lenient toward the plaintiff, because the
plaintiff need only establish interference with use and enjoyment of real
property, not with possession thereof. Accordingly, the plaintiff need not
show that he holds a possessory interest in the land, and an easement or
right-of-way will suffice. 197 Yet even here, some property right must be
shown, and a mere lodger' 91or licensee' 99 cannot recover. In public nuisance,
the rules are still more liberal in favor of the plaintiff since only an
interference with life, not necessarily with property rights, need be shown.
Thus, no property right in the area affected by the alleged nuisance need
193. See Brenner v. Haley, 185 Cal. App. 2d 183, 8 Cal. Rptr. 224 (1960) (one holding
under illegal lease may maintain trespass); Southern Ry. v. Horine, 121 Ga. 386, 49 S.E. 285
(1904); Nickerson v. Thacher, 146 Mass. 609, 16 N.E. 581 (1888); Frisbee v. Town of Marshall,
122 N.C. 760, 30 S.E. 21 (1898); Langdon v. Templeton, 66 Vt. 173, 28 A. 866 (1894) (adverse
possessor may maintain trespass); cf. Zimmerman v. Shreeve, 59 Md. 357, 361 (1881) (trespass
harms possessory rights; thus, the plaintiff must show actual or constructive possession at time
of invasion). If the plaintiff has possession but lacks valid legal title, defendant may not use
that lack of legal title as a defense unless defendant is able to show a superior right in himself.
Thus, defendant may not assert the superior right of a third party unless he can connect
himself with that right. See Kirk v. Cassady, 217 Ky. 87, 288 S.W. 1045 (1926).
194. See State ex rl. Green v. Gibson Circuit Court, 246 Ind. 446, 206 N.E.2d 135 (1965);
Chloupek v. Perotka, 89 Wis. 551, 62 N.W. 537 (1895). See generally Note, The Possession
Necessary to Support an Action for Trespass on Real Property, 11 VA. L. Rsv. 476 (1925).
195. Powers v. Clarkson, 17 Kan. 218 (1876); Sabine & E. Tex. Ry. v. Johnson, 65 Tex.
389 (1886); Bakersfield Religious Congregational Soc'y v. Baker, 15 Vt. 119 (1843).
196. Bascom v. Dempsy, 143 Mass. 409, 9 N.E. 744 (1887); see Croasdale v. Butell, 177
Kan. 487, 280 P.2d 593 (1955); Cherry v. Lake Drummond Canal & Water Co., 140 N.C.
422, 53 S.E. 138 (1906).
197. See Hancock v. Moriarity, 215 Ga. 274, 110 S.E.2d 403 (1959) (right to use alley);
Webber v. Wright, 124 Me. 190, 126 A. 737 (1924) (right to passage, light and air); Herman
v. Roberts, 119 N.Y. 37, 23 N.E. 442 (1890) (right of way). An adverse possessor may maintain
private nuisance. Brink v. Moeschl Edwards Corrugating Co., 142 Ky. 88, 133 S.W. 1147
(1911). A tenant may maintain such an action and recover for the harm to his term. Bowden
v. Edison Elec. Illuminating Co., 29 Misc. 171, 60 N.Y.S. 835 (Sup. Ct. 1899). However, a
tenant may not recoveT for harm to the reversion. Klassen v. Central Kansas Coop. Creamery
Ass'n, 160 Kan. 697, 165 P.2d 601 (1946). With the holder of the reversionary interest, the
rule is the reverse: the tcnant may recover for permanent harm to the property, but not for
harm merely to the present use or enjoyment. See McConnell v. Cambridge R.R., 151 Mass.
159, 23 N.E. 841 (1890); Miller v. Edison Elec. Illuminating Co., 184 N.Y. 17, 76 N.E. 734
(1906); Gotwals v. City cof Wessington Springs, 60 S.D. 428, 244 N.W. 649 (1932).
198. See Reber v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 161 Miss. 885, 138 So. 574 (1932).
199. See Elliott v. Mason, 76 N.H. 229, 81 A. 701 (1911). A mere employee also cannot
recover in private nuisance. Broderick v. City of Waterbury, 130 Conn. 601, 36 A.2d 585
(1944); Page v. Niagara Chem. Div., 68 So. 2d 382 (Fla. 1953); Daurizio v. Merchants'
Despatch Transp. Co., 152 Misc. 716, 274 N.Y.S. 174 (Sup. Ct. 1934); cf. Connerty v.
Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n, 398 Mass. 140, 495 N.E.2d 840 (1986) (clam digger with revocable
license to harvest clams had no property interest sufficient to support private nuisance suit for
pollution of waters).
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be established.2® In any nuisance case, however, the plaintiff does have to
show actual harm, and in private nuisance it must be harm to the plaintiff's
rights and privileges in real property.201
A final difference between trespass and nuisance may be observed in
many of the cases dealing with alleged governmental "takings" of property,
particularly when the taking is alleged to have occurred through airplane
flights over the land or other above-surface or sub-surface disturbance.20 2
In the case of overflights, for instance, the majority view is that a taking
is shown only if an invasion of the airspace directly above the plaintiff's
property is established. 2 3 The taking in effect must be predicated on a
"trespass" in the old sense of an unauthorized entry to the space that a
landowner owns, which is the space extending up to the heavens and down
to the center of the earth.2' However, flights near the plaintiffs property
may, even if they do not pass directly over that property, certainly constitute
a nuisance,2 5 and there is a minority view, taken in Oregon2  and Wash-
ington,207 that allows a claim of taking to be based on an underlying
nuisance, whether or not any technical trespass has occurred.
200. See Crime in Tort Law, supra note 7, at 339. See generally Estey, Public Nuisance
and Standing to Sue, 10 OSOOODE HALL L.J. 563 (1972); Rothstein, Private Action for Public
Nuisance: The Standing Problem, 76 W. VA. L. REv. 453 (1974).
201. See Amphitheaters, Inc. v. Portland Meadows, 184 Or. 336, 352-53, 198 P.2d 847, 854
(1948).
202. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, at 81-82 (discussing the leading cases of Griggs
v. County of Allegheny, 369 U.S. 84 (1962); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946)).
See generally Hill, Liability for Aircraft Noise - The Aftermath of Causby and Griggs, 19
U. MI~m L. REv. 1 (1964); Note, Airplane Noise, supra note 67, at 1593-95; Note, Inverse
Condemnation and Nuisance: Alternative Remedies for Airport Noise Damage, 24 SYRACUSE
L. REv. 793 (1973).
203. Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 955
(1963); Freeman v. United States, 167 F. Supp. 541 (W.D. Okla. 1958); see Note, Government
Immunity and Liability - Tucker Act - No Liability for Noise, Smoke, and Vibrations Made
by Jet Planes Flying Over Land Adjacent to That of The Plaintiff, 16 VAND. L. REV. 430
(1963); cf. Nunnally v. United States, 239 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1956) (no taking when no direct
invasion by ordnance proving grounds); Pope v. United States, 173 F. Supp. 36 (N.D. Tex.
1959) (landowners entitled to compensation for Air Force flights over their land but not for
operation of test cell on their property which caused them same kind of disturbances as
suffered by others in area).
204. See Freeman, 167 F. Supp. at 544, relying on Causby, 328 U.S. at 264-66; Highland
Park, Inc. v. United States, 161 F. Supp. 597 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
205. See Nestle v. City of Santa Monica, 6 Cal. 3d 920, 496 P.2d 480, 101 Cal. Rptr. 568
(1972) (jet aircraft flights to and from municipal airport held not to support the plaintiffs'
inverse condemnation claim, but possible nuisance claim recognized).
206. Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 233 Or. 178, 376 P.2d 100 (1962).
207. Martin v. Port of Seattle, 64 Wash. 2d 309, 391 P.2d 540 (1964), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 989 (1965). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 159 (1964); cf. Matson v. United
States, 171 F. Supp. 283 (Ct. CI. 1959) (flights below minimum altitude during landings and
takeoffs constitute taking even though they are within statutory definition of "navigable
airspace"); Henthorn v. Oklahoma City, 453 P.2d 1013 (Okla. 1969) (substantial interference
by low flights over or in close proximity to the plaintiff's land can be basis of taking claim).
But cf. Cheskov v. Port of Seattle, 55 Wash. 2d 416, 348 P.2d 673 (1960) (flights within
navigable airspace found not to constitute taking), a case not cited in Martin. See generally
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Summary and Forecast
Trespass and nuisance, then, have in some respects been moved closer
together by court opinions of recent decades. First, there is authority, chiefly
in Oregon, which introduces a balancing test into trespass analysis, such as
has always been present in private nuisance. Yet here the balancing is
performed to deterine the scope of exclusive possession rather than the
extent of the possessor's interest in use and enjoyment. Second, there is
authority, mainly in Washington state, imposing a requirement of actual
harm, such as is always present in nuisance cases, in those trespass cases
that display no tangible entry. Third, subject to the above-mentioned two
modifications, there is authority in Oregon, Washington, and other juris-
dictions allowing trespass liability to be found when there is no tangible or
visible entry, even though nuisance liability is normally also a possibility in
such situations. Fourth, there is a trend toward treating private nuisance as
an exclusively intentional tort (though this is probably still a minority view),
just as trespass has long been.
However, there remain a number of differences between trespass and
private nuisance. First, the great weight of authority still requires a tangible,
visible entry for trespass liability, while this is never essential to nuisance.
Second, most authorities still allow nuisance to be based on intent or
negligence or, when an abnormally dangerous activity is present, strict
liability, even though it is true that the label "nuisance" in the negligence
or strict liability cases may add nothing but confusion to the picture.
Trespass, on the other hand, must be based on intent. Third, when intent
is the basis of nuisance, it is a different intent from that needed for trespass.
In nuisance, the relevant intent is to disturb the plaintiff's use and enjoyment
of his real property. In trespass, it is the intent to go upon or use the
plaintiff's real property, thus interfering with his right of exclusive posses-
sion. Fourth, trespass liability can be established only if the plaintiff shows
a possessory interest in the real property involved. In nuisance, however,
any property rights will suffice. Further, when a disturbance occurs above
or below the surface, trespass liability is now usually considered inappro-
priate, at least unless the disturbance was within the "immediate reaches"
of the surface; nuisance is the appropriate action. Fifth, actual harm is
necessary to nuisance liability, but it is generally unneeded in trespass.
Finally, all of the above-mentioned differences mirror the underlying dis-
tinction that trespass involves interference with possession while nuisance
involves interference with use and enjoyment.
In light of the continuing differences between the torts, it is submitted
that they will continue to have separate identities and that both are needed
in order to address all situations of unjustified interferences with property.
Some of the limitations imposed in the past, such as the distinction between





tangible and intangible invasions, now often appear irrelevant and difficult
to draw and will likely disappear in time. The overlap of nuisance with
negligence and strict liability presents unnecessary duplication, plus confu-
sion as to applicable defenses, and thus nuisance is likely to become, like
trespass, an exclusively intentional tort - perhaps covered in Torts courses
along with trespass, battery, etc., rather than separately as in the past. Yet
the overlap between trespass and nuisance appears inevitable since interfer-
ence with possession and interference with use and enjoyment will themselves
inevitably often overlap. With the dissolving of the aforementioned old
barriers, the overlap is likely to increase. In cases within this borderland,
"the action may be maintained upon either basis as the plaintiff elects or
both .. .. "-201
Typically, trespass is going upon another's property without authorization,
and nuisance is using one's own property to the disturbance of one's
neighbor.2 9 Yet the breadth of nuisance is such that it may exist whether
or not one goes onto another's property - and thus the overlap. A review
of the cases does not find the oft-sought "simple and satisfying answer" 210
to the question of distinguishing the torts of trespass and nuisance but does
show that they have coexisted for centuries and are likely to do so for
centuries more.
208. REsTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 821D comment e (1977). See Bradley v. American
Smelting & Ref. Co., 104 Wash. 2d 677, 689, 709 P.2d 782, 789 (1985) (quoting and applying
the Restatement language).
209. See Fairlawn Cemetery Ass'n v. First Presbyterian Church, 496 P.2d 1185, 1187 (Okla.
1972).
210. See Fairview Farms, Inc. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 176 F. Supp. 178, 184 (D. Or. 1959)
(finding that a review of the Oregon cases did not give such an answer to the problem of
distinguishing trespass and nuisance).
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